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INTRODUCTION

Miscalculating or overlooking an appellate deadline can happen to
any attorney, from a recent law school graduate to an appellate specialist having numerous cases on appeal, all with different deadlines
for the bond, record and briefs. On some occasions, it is simply impossible to comply with the filing timetable. Other times, an appellate
deadline might be missed due to an accident or negligence.
In recent years, the supreme court has revised the appellate rules to
eliminate jurisdictional traps from Texas appellate procedure which
often resulted in the disposition of appeals without any review of the
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merits.' Despite those revisions, missed appellate deadlines remain
not only potentially fatal to the client's chances of successfully overturning or preserving a judgment on appeal, but can also result in the
appellate attorney incurring substantial malpractice liability.2 To ensure that the client's interests are represented effectively on appeal
and to avoid malpractice exposure, any attorney handling a civil case
on appeal must be aware of significant deadlines, comply with those
deadlines, or file an extension motion which is sufficient legally and
factually to support the appellate court's extension of the filing
timetable.
II.

THE DEADLINES

A.

Calculating Deadlines
1. In General
The date the trial judge signs the judgment or appealable order is
the critical date for an appeal. The date the judge announces the
judgment from the bench,4 sends a letter to counsel5 or the date the
1. Lopez v. Foremost Paving, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 614, 617-19 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1984)(denying motions to dismiss and granting extension of time to file appeal bond); see B.D.
Click Co. v. Safari Drilling Corp., 638 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Tex. 1982); see also Westergard,
Motions for Extension of Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 581, 581 (1981)(Texas
Supreme Court changed rules to permit extension of deadlines because requiring strict compliance with appellate timetables often denied litigant right to appellate review).
2. See Irwin v. Dwight B. Heard Inv. Co, 281 P. 213, 214 (Ariz. 1929)(failure to timely
file appellate brief exposes counsel to malpractice liability); Millhouse v. Wiesenthal, No. 0187-01002-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] August 18, 1988) (WESTLAW, Tx-Cs library)
(malpractice action alleging attorney mishandled appeal by failing to timely request extension
of time to file statement of facts); Welder v. Mercer, 448 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Ark. 1970)(attorney
who negligently failed to timely file transcript held liable for client's out-of-pocket expenses);
Daugert v. Pappas, 704 P.2d 600, 602 (Wash. 1985)(en banc)(discussing law firm's liability for
adverse judgment against client when firm missed deadline for supreme court review by single
day). As emphasized by the director of a legal clinic specifically designed to alert law students
to their malpractice exposure, "we highlight danger points, like missing appeal deadlines."
Tabac, Crossfireat the Bar, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1987, at 30, col. 1 (quoting Professor of Law
Gary H. Palm, Cleveland State University).
3. See Goffv. Tuchscherer, 627 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tex. 1982). The Supreme Court in Goff
stressed "[t]he time from which one counts days from the appellate steps is that day on which
the judge reduces to writing the judgment, decision or order that is the official, formal and
authentic adjudication of the court upon the respective rights and claims of the parties." Id. at
398; see also Keltner, Post-Judgment Remedies, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED PERSONAL INJURY COURSE BB-3 (1987)("judge's signature is single most important act in the
appellate process").
4. See Foremost Paving, Inc., 671 S.W.2d at 617-19 (appellate timetable runs from written, signed orders and not from oral pronouncements).
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clerk enters the judgment 6 is immaterial to appellate deadlines. All
appellate deadlines in the court of appeals, other than briefing deadlines or deadlines altered by the court when granting an extension
motion, are based on the date the judge signs the judgment or order.7
Since the date the judgment or appealable order is signed determines the beginning of the periods specified in the appellate rules for
filing in trial and appellate courts documents connected with an appeal, there should be no confusion in the record concerning the date
the judgment was signed.' For that reason, appellate rule 5(b)(2) directs: "Judges, attorneys and clerks ... to use their best efforts to
cause all judgments, decisions and orders of any kind in civil cases to
be reduced to writing and signed by the trial judge with the date of
signing stated therein." 9 Rule 5 is designed to fulfill the Supreme
Court's mandate in Burrell v. Cornelius that all judgments should include the following line:
''I°
,1_.
- day of
"SIGNED this
If no date is shown on the face of the appealable order or judgment,
despite the trial court's and counsel's "best efforts," the date of signing may be shown in the appellate record through a certificate of the
judge or by other methods of proof." Conversely, if the date of the
signature on the judgment is incorrect, that defect can be corrected
through a nunc pro tunc order.12
5. Goff, 627 S.W.2d at 398-99 (letter to counsel announcing ruling on venue motion did
not constitute judgment or order for appellate purposes); accord Mays v. Foremost Ins. Co.,
627 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ)(trial judge's letter to counsel
does not begin period for filing of cost bond or transcript).
6. See Burrell v. Cornelius, 559 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977)(filing of
judgment by clerk does not establish date of judgment), rev'd on other grounds, 570 S.W.2d 382
(Tex. 1978).
7. See Keltner, Post-Judgment Remedies, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED PERSONAL INJURY COURSE BB-3 (1987); O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF
TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-7 (1988).
8. Burrell, 570 S.W.2d at 383 (criticizing bench and bar for carelessness in adhering to
rule that all judgments should reflect date signed); Ortiz v. O.J. Beck & Sons, Inc., 611 S.W.2d
860, 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ)(imprecise use of terms such as rendition, filing, entry and signing of judgments causes confusion and should be avoided).
9. TEX. R. APP. P. 5(b)(2). All textual references are to the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
10. See Burrell, 570 S.W.2d at 384; see also Storey, The Appellate Process, in SOUTH
TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW, APPELLATE PRACTICE INSTITUTE E-I (1988).
11. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5(b)(2).
12. See Cyrus v. State, 601 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(omission of date clerical error correctable by nunc pro tunc order); see also O'Connor,
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While the date the judgment was signed is the starting point for the
appellate schedule, that date is not included when calculating appellate deadlines.'" Nor is the last day of an appellate filing period included if that day is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, "as defined
by Article 4591."' In that situation, the period for filing is extended
to the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. 5
Several writers have correctly recognized that the dates which qualify as "legal holidays" for appellate deadline purposes are unsettled.1 6
Prior to the adoption of the appellate rules, rule 4 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure governed deadline calculation.' 7 While rule 5 limits legal holidays to those defined by Article 4591, civil procedure rule
4 simply provided, and still provides, that the last day of a period is
not counted if falling on a "legal holiday."'" In construing civil procedure rule 4, the supreme court has held that a "legal holiday," for
purposes of computing time limits, includes not only those days designated officially as holidays by Article 4591 but also those dates recognized by "legislative declaration as being general holidays by popular
acceptance." 1 9 To illustrate, banking statutes which provide that a
Friday or Monday constitutes a holiday when the designated holiday
falls on a weekend create "legal holidays" for deadline purposes under

civil procedure rule

4.20

Since legal holidays under the appellate rules are apparently limited
to those found in Article 4591, it is questionable whether those holidays recognized by the legislature as being general holidays by popuPerfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE
C-7 (1988).
13. See TEX. R. ApP. P. 5(a).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See Davis, When is the Next Day the Last Day, 51 TEX. BAR J. 451, 454 (1988);
O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-3 (1988).
17. See Davis, When is the Next Day the Last Day, 51 TEX. BAR J. 451, 451 (1988).
18. Compare TEX. R. APP. P. 5(a) with TEX. R. Civ. P. 4.
19. See Blackman v. Housing Auth. of City of Dallas, 254 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex.
1953)(day after Texas Independence Day, a Monday, qualified as legal holiday so record
timely filed on Tuesday); see also Johnson v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 674 S.W.2d 761, 762
(Tex. 1984)(reaffirming Blackman rule).
20. See Johnson, 674 S.W.2d at 762. Holidays for state employees declared pursuant to
the Appropriations Act similarly qualify as general holidays by popular acceptance. Freeman
v. Del Mar College, 716 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ); see
generallyO'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE
PRACTICE COURSE C-3 (1988).
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lar acceptance can be used to enlarge appellate time periods. There is
no reason for the "legal holidays" to differ depending on whether a
litigant is in trial or appellate court;21 yet, until the issue is clearly
resolved, appellate counsel should rely solely on holidays listed in Article 4591.22

In some counties, the courthouse may be closed for a local holiday
even though the date does not qualify as a legal holiday or general
holiday by popular acceptance. Local holidays are not legal holidays;
therefore the appellate deadline is not extended to the following day.2"
If counsel knows that the courthouse will be closed on the last day for
filing an appellate document and is uncertain whether it is a legal holiday, contact the clerk prior to the due date and make arrangements
for the clerk to open the courthouse or accept the document for filing
at the clerk's home.24 If the clerk cannot be located, then find a judge
and take it to his or her home.25 If neither a clerk nor a judge can be
located who is willing to accept the document for filing, it will be
necessary to file an extension motion reasonably explaining why the
document was not filed on time and proving that you attempted to
meet the deadline.26
The appellate filing timetable differs when the mails are used instead of hand delivery. Unfortunately, as several Texas commentators have observed, there is a conflict between the two appellate rules
which discuss filing by mail.27 Under rule 4(b), if any matter concerning an appeal, writ of error, or application for writ of error is sent to
21. See Davis, When is the Next Day the Last Day, 51 TEX. BAR J. 451, 454 (1988).
22. O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE
PRACTICE COURSE C-3 (1988); see Story, The Appellate Process, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
APPELLATE PRACTICE INSTITUTE E-2 (1988)(only holidays in Article 4591 should be used
when calculating appellate deadlines).
23. Del Castillo v. Lowry, 698 S.W.2d 367, 368-69 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1985, orig. proc.)(though Harris County Courthouse was closed in recognition of San Jacinto
Day, deadline for filing contest to affidavit in lieu of appeal bond not extended to following
day); see generally Bracken, Mechanics of Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, PROCEDURAL
INSTITUTE: APPELLATE PRACTICE D-3 (1986).

24. O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE
PRACTICE COURSE G-2 (1987).
25. Id.
26. See Ziddell v. NHP Real Estate Co., 643 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982,
no writ)(refusing to hold that closing of courthouse by commissioner's court constituted legal
holiday and emphasizing absence of proof in record showing courthouse actually closed).
27. See Davis, When is the Next Day the Last Day, 51 TEX. BAR J. 451, 452 (1988); 31 J.
WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 563 (Tex. Practice Supp. 1987).
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the proper clerk by United States Mail, First Class, in a properly addressed envelope, stamped and deposited in the mail "one day or
more before the last day" for filing, it is deemed timely filed if received
by the clerk no more than ten days after the due date."8 In contrast,

appellate rule 5(a) states that any paper filed by mail as provided in
rule 4 is mailed on time when it is mailed "on the last day" of the
period.2 9 So, rule 5 permits mailing on the last day while rule 4 does
not. a° Until the conflict is resolved, appellate matters should be
mailed at least one day early. 3 '
The relationship between the rules permitting filing by mail and the
final sentence of rule 5 which provides that the last day of an appellate
period is not counted if it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday is

also unclear.32 Most courts have concluded; however, that a party
filing appellate documents by mail cannot rely on rule 5.33 Consequently, if the due date falls on a Monday, the last day for mailing is
Sunday. 34 If the due date falls on a Sunday, then the appellate document should be mailed on Saturday, even though the document could
28. TEX. R. APP. P. 4(b).
29. TEX. R. ApP. P. 5(a).
30. In addition, while rule 4(b) requires the clerk to receive the paper within ten days of
mailing, rule 5(a) contains no such limitation. See 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE
PROCEDURE § 563 (Tex. Practice Supp. 1987).
31. Davis, When is the Next Day the Last Day, 51 TEX. BAR J. 451, 454 (1988).
32. See id.
33. See Fellowship Missionary Baptist Church of Dallas, Inc. v. Sigel, 749 S.W.2d 186,
187-89 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ)(dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction and discussing authorities).
34. See, e.g., Fellowship Missionary Baptist Church, 749 S.W.2d at 187 (compliance with
rule 4 by depositing document in mail one day prior to last day of period to timely file is
prerequisite to trigger extension period of rule 5(a)); Walkup v. Thompson, 704 S.W.2d 938,
938 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(per curiam)(rule 4 cannot extend last
day to file cost bond under rule 5 from Sunday to Monday); Martin Hedrick Co. v. Gotches,
656 S.W.2d 509, 510-11 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(rule 4 not available to allow
party to deposit statement of facts in mail on same day statement of facts due in appellate
court). The courts in Sigel, Walkup and Gotches rejected the reasoning of the lone court to
reach the opposite conclusion. Ector County Indep. School Dist. v. Hopkins, 518 S.W.2d 576,
583 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ)(rule 4 negates specific provision of rule 5 requiring information relating to appeal to be deposited in mail one day or more prior to last day for
timely filing). The fact that the post office might not postmark mail deposited on Sunday does
not justify an untimely mailing since a postmark is merely prima facie proof of the date of
mailing. In the absence of a postmark, the date of mailing can be proven by affidavit. See
Fellowship Missionary Baptist Church, 749 S.W.2d at 189 (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction due to untimely cash deposit and absent sworn proof to contrary); see also TEX. R.
APP. P. 4(b), 19(d). To avoid an unnecessary dispute over mailing dates, it is preferable to
mail the document on Saturday when it can be postmarked.
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be filed by hand two days later on Monday.35
Under the rule governing the impact of mailing on appellate schedules, prima facie proof of the date of mailing is provided by a certificate of mailing by the United States Postal Service or a legible
postmark affixed by the postal service.36 Counsel should not rely on
the law firm's postage meter as proof of mailing. Texas courts have
recognized that a postmark affixed by a law firm postal meter does not
satisfy the evidentiary requirements of rule 4 and is not prima facie
proof of timely mailing. 7 At best, such a postmark is merely some
evidence of the date of mailing, in contrast to the essentially conclusive effect of a postal service postmark.3
2.

Motions for New Trial

Under civil procedure rule 329b, appellate deadlines are enlarged
by a timely filed motion for new trial or motion to modify, correct or
reform the judgment.3 9 An untimely rule 329b motion is a nullity.'
Only the initial motion for new trial filed by any party affects the
appellate timetable as the subsequent filing of an amended motion or a
motion by another party does not additionally enlarge appellate due
35. See Davis, When is the Next Day the Last Day, 51 TEX. BAR J. 451, 454 (1988)(caution dictates mailing at least one day before last day as originally computed without regard to
whether last day is holiday).
36. See TEX. R. APP. P. 4(b).
37. See Perez v. State, 629 S.W.2d 834, 838 n.3 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, no writ); Hopkins, 518 S.W.2d at 583.
38. See Hopkins, 518 S.W.2d at 583 (better practice is to use official postal service
postmark).
39. See 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 360 (Tex. Practice

1985). A motion for new trial and motions to correct, modify or reform judgments have identical impact on the appellate timetable and must be filed within thirty days after the signing of
the judgment. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329(b). Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 5, a party is
entitled to mail a motion for new trial to the clerk for filing and it will be deemed timely filed if
deposited in the mail one day or more before the due date and received by the clerk no later
than ten days after the filing deadline. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 5.
40. Pampell v. Pampell, 699 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ). The
due date for a motion for new trial cannot be extended by agreement by the trial judge or by an
appellate court. Gomez v. Bryant, 750 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no
writ)(parties cannot agree to extension of trial court's jurisdiction over new trial motion); Lind
v. Gresham, 672 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ)(trial court
has no power to permit late filing of new trial motion); TEX. R. Clv. P. 5 (trial court may not
enlarge period for taking action relating to new trials "except as stated in their rules"). See
generally Keltner, Post-JudgmentRemedies, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED PERSONAL
INJURY COURSE BB-l 1 (1987)(time period for filing new trial motion essentially absolute).
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dates.4 The date the motion is overruled has no affect on deadlines; it
is the filing of a timely motion alone which automatically enlarges the
timetable.42
A premature motion for new trial, i.e., one filed prior to the rendition of judgment, is effective to enlarge the timetable. The motion will
be viewed as having been filed on the day of, but subsequent to, the
judgment.43
Determining the impact of a post-judgment motion on the appellate
timetable can be confusing when the trial court renders multiple judgments. If the judgment is corrected, modified or reformed "in any
respect" while the trial court has plenary jurisdiction, the time for
appeal runs from the time the corrected, modified or reformed judgment is signed." On the other hand, if the change in the judgment is
made after the expiration of plenary jurisdiction and involves a correction of a clerical mistake, the appellate timetable runs from the
date of the signing of the order to correct the clerical error, i.e., the
nunc pro tunc order, only as to those matters not litigated in the origi41. 4 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 18.06.2 (revised 1984); 6 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 140.03[1] (1988); see TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e).
42. See 6 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 140.03[2] (1988)(trial court's action or inaction on new trial motion generally has no effect on time to perfect appeal). To
extend filing deadlines, it is only necessary to timely file the motion. The fact that the movant
failed to give proper notice to opposing counsel or pay the filing fee at the time of filing the
motion does not invalidate the motion. See Arndt v. Arndt, 709 S.W.2d 281, 232-33 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ)(motion timely filed although fee not paid until
32nd day after judgment signed); Zephyr v. Zephyr, 683 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1984, no writ)(failure to notify opponent of filing of new trial motion). Motions
for new trial are not permitted in certain types of litigation. See TEX. R. App. P. 42(a)(1) (in
appeals from interlocutory orders, no motion for new trial shall be filed).
43. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 306c (premature new trial motion deemed filed on date of but
"subsequent to" signing of judgment). But see Reitmeyer v. Clawson, 634 S.W.2d 379, 382
(Tex. App.-Austin 1982, no writ)(Rule 306c inapplicable to motion which attacked nonappealable order and not referable to final judgment eventually rendered). In contrast, a premature motion to reinstate from a dismissal for want of prosecution is ineffective to enlarge
deadlines. See Hales v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1986, no writ).
44. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(h); see also Miller v. Hernandez, 708 S.W.2d 25, 26 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Garza v. Serrato, 671 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1984)(denying motion to dismiss). During the period of plenary jurisdiction, the trial court's
power to modify its judgment is essentially absolute. Garza, 671 S.W.2d at 714. Moreover,
any change in the judgment need not be material to restart the appellate timetable. Id. at 715
(litigant's right to appellate review no longer turns on whether second judgment made material
change in original). See generally 6 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 140.04
(1988)(law remains unsettled concerning need for judgment to be materially altered to restart
appellate timetable).
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nal judgment.4 5 In other words, a litigant cannot evade the penalty
for missing the deadline for the appeal from the judgment on the merits by obtaining a nunc pro tunc order and then starting anew the
appellate deadlines for appealing from the entire judgment.4 6
A critical question arises when counsel for the losing party files a
motion for new trial complaining of the first judgment, but not the
second. Does that prior motion enlarge the appellate deadlines for
the appeal from the second judgment? If the motion complaining
about the first judgment involves a matter which remained unchanged
in the second judgment, then a second motion for new trial should not
be necessary to enlarge the deadlines for an appeal from the second
judgment 7 or to preserve error.4 8 For purposes of calculating deadlines, the motion for new trial attacking the first judgment will be
treated as if it had also attacked the second judgment.4 9 There is authority, however, that if the initial motion for new trial was overruled
prior to rendition of the second judgment, it is necessary to file a sec45. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(h); TEX. R. APP. P. 5(c); see also Pruet v. Coastal States
Trading, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, no writ)(refusing to
review complaints about nunc pro tunc judgment which could have been raised in appeal from
first judgment).
46. See 6 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 140.04 (1988); Bracken, Mechanics of Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE: APPELLATE PRACTICE D-

2, D-3 (1986); see also Cavalier Corp. v. Store Enter., Inc., 742 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. App.Dallas 1987, no writ)(dismissing appeal due to untimely filed bond and holding correction of
appellant's name by nunc pro tunc order did not restart appellate timetable).
47. 6 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 142.01[3] (Supp. 1988)(when judg-

ment modified on basis of motion to modify and further motion not filed then initial motion
inapplicable to second judgment because movant already received all relief requested).
48. A second motion will be necessary to preserve error if the modified judgment raises
an issue not found in the first judgment. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b) (setting out complaints for
which new trial motion prerequisite to appellate review).
49. See Miller v. Hernandez, 708 S.W.2d 25, 25-27 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986)(denying
motion to dismiss); see also A.G. Solar & Co. v. Nordyke, 744 S.W.2d 646, 647-48 (Tex.
App.- Dallas 1988, no writ). This result is supported by the plain language of rule 58 which
provides that if the trial judge has corrected or reformed the order being appealed from, or has
vacated that order and signed another, then "any proceedings relating to an appeal of the first
order may be considered applicable to the second." TEX. R. APP. P. 58(c); see also TEX. R.
Civ. P. 306c (premature motion for new trial deemed filed on date of but subsequent to signing
of judgment assailed by motion); TEX. R. APP. P. 58(a) (proceedings relating to appeal not
considered ineffective due to prematurity if "subsequent appealable order has been signed to
which premature proceeding may properly be applied"). Several courts, however, in cursory
opinions have apparently held that the extension of time provided by a new trial motion applies only to the judgment actually assailed by that motion. See American Home Assurance v.
Faglie, 747 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ); Kitchens v. Kitchens, 737 S.W.2d
101, 102 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, no writ).
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ond motion identical to the first.5 0
There is controversy over whether a procedurally deficient or misnamed post-judgment motion operates to extend appellate deadlines.
In First Freeport National Bank v. Brazoswood National Bank,5 the
court of appeals ruled that a post-judgment motion entitled, "Motion
to Disregard Special Issue Findings and to Modify and Enter Judgment," was actually a motion for judgment n.o.v., did not qualify as a
civil procedure rule 329b motion and, therefore, did not enlarge the
timetable. 2 However, other courts have reasoned that any post-judgment motion regardless of the motion's title or prayer, which if
granted would result in a substantive change in the judgment, extends
the time for perfecting appeal.5 3 Even if the motion is skeletal or ineffective to preserve anything for appellate review, deadlines are
54
extended.
Another peculiar area of motion for new trial practice involves the
lack of notice to the litigant of an adverse judgment. Despite
mandatory appellate and trial rules requiring court clerks to promptly
notify all parties of the entry of a judgment," most litigators have
experienced the case where the judgment debtor complains he or she
had no notice of entry of judgment. Appellate rule 5(b)(4) and civil
procedure rule 306a(4) might provide a remedy in that situation.
Under those rules, if neither counsel nor his client received the statutorily required notice, nor acquired actual knowledge of the judgment
or appealable order within twenty days after it was signed, then the
appellate timetable begins from the date the party or his attorney re-

50. A. G. Solar & Co., 744 S.W.2d at 647-48 (if initial motion overruled before trial court
renders reformed judgment then second motion for new trial needed to enlarge deadlines from
appeal of second judgment).

51. 712 S.W.2d 168, 169-70 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
52. See id. at 169-70.
53. See Taylor v. Trans-Continental Properties, Ltd., 739 S.W.2d 873, 876-77 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1987, no writ); Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Callejo, 734 S.W.2d 126, 128
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1987)(denying motion to dismiss), writ granted, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 326
(April 20, 1988).
54. Neily v. Aaron, 724 S.W.2d 908, 910-11 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no

writ)(timely filed but impermissible general motion for new trial failed to preserve error for
appellate review but extended time to perfect appeal). In contrast, a defective motion to reinstate a cause following dismissal for lack of prosecution does not extend the time for perfecting
appeal. See Butts v. Capitol City Nursing Home, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tex. 1986).
55. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 239a (default judgments); TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(3) (final judgments and appealable orders); TEX. R. App. P. 5(b)(3) (final judgments and other appealable
orders); TEX. R. App. P. 5(e) (appellate court judgments).
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ceived the notice or acquired actual knowledge. 56
To expand deadlines based on lack of notice, the movant must file a
sworn motion in the trial court alleging: (1) the date the party or his

attorney first either received notice of the judgment or acquired actual
knowledge of the signing, and (2) that this date was more than twenty
days after the judgment was signed.57 The movant should request a

hearing before the trial court and prove the sworn allegations.58 Furthermore, the movant should obtain a finding of fact from the trial
court establishing the date of receipt of the notice or acquisition of
actual knowledge. That finding will be the starting point for the calculation of the appellate schedule.5 9
There is one significant limitation on the availability of the "no-

notice" relief. That rule provides that in no event shall the appellate
timetable begin more than ninety days after the original judgment or
appealable order is signed. 6° Consequently, a party who learns of a

judgment ninety-one days after rendition will be unable to pursue a
regular appeal but will be forced to challenge the judgment by writ of
error or bill of review. 6 '
B.

Perfecting the Appealk The Appeal Bond or Substitute

Timely perfection of appeal is an indispensable prerequisite to invoking the jurisdiction of the appellate court. An appeal is perfected
by filing the cost bond on appeal or a substitute for the bond, such as
a cash deposit or affidavit of inability to pay costs of appeal, or notice

56. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(5); TEX. R. App. P. 5(b)(5).
57. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4); TEX. R. App. P. 5(b)(4).
58. See Olvera v. Olvera, 705 S.W.2d 283, 284 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(sworn motion claiming no notice of judgment which was not presented for evidentiary
hearing and was overruled by operation of law did not extend time for perfecting appeal). For
examples of litigants who failed to comply with the procedural and evidentiary rules governing
motions for new trial alleging no notice of the judgment, see Memorial Hosp. v. Gillis, 741
S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. 1987), Sabine Towing and Transp. Co. v. Evans, 709 S.W.2d 783, 784-85
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Olvera, 705 S.W.2d at 284 (opinion on
motion for rehearing).
59. See Payne & Keller Co. v. Word, 732 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(without fact finding appellate court cannot determine if movant
met burden under rule 306a(4)); see also TEX. R. App. P. 5(b)(4).
60. See TEX. R. App. P. 5(b)(4).
61. See KELTNER, Post-Judgment Remedies, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCE PERSONAL INJURY COURSE BB-3 (1987)(no notice rule available to litigant discovering judgment
on 21st day but not on 20th day).
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of appeal.62 If the deadline for perfecting the appeal is missed and not
extended by the appellate court, then the right to appeal is irretrievably lost.63
The appeal bond must be filed with the clerk of the trial court not the court of appeals'M - no later than thirty days after the signing
of the judgment if a motion for new trial has not been filed.6 5 If a
motion for new trial or a motion to vacate, modify, reform or correct
the judgment has been timely filed by any party,6 6 then the bond must
be filed within ninety days after the signing of the judgment. 67 The
deadline for perfecting an appeal is identical whether appellant relies
on a bond, cash deposit, notice of appeal or affidavit of inability.68
A premature attempt to perfect an appeal, such as by filing a cost
bond or its substitute before the judgment is signed, is effective to
preserve the right to appeal.6 9 The prematurely filed bond or substi62. TEX. R. APP. P. 40(a)(l). A discussion of the parties required to file a bond to perfect
an appeal, as well as the requisites of an appeal bond, is beyond the scope of this article.
Certain individuals and entities are exempt by statute from filing a bond and, instead, perfect
an appeal by filing a notice of appeal. See generally 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 561 (Tex. Practice 1985). Also, if the party primarily prevailing in the
trial court is not entirely satisfied with the judgment, it may be necessary for that party to
perfect a separate appeal in order to invoke appellate jurisdiction over its complaints. See
generally Hecht, Limited & CrossAppeals, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE
PROCEDURE COURSE (1987); Patrick & Watkins, Limited and Cross Appeals, in STATE BAR
OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE (1988).

63. In literally hundreds of cases, appeals have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction
due to the absence of a timely filed bond or substitute. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Huber, Hunt &
Nichols, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 9, 10 (Tex. App.-San Antonio), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 671
S.W.2d 869 (Tex. 1984); Ziddell v. NHP Real Estate, 643 S.W.2d 199, 199-200 (Tex. App.Austin 1982, no writ); First Nat'l Bank in Dallas v. Dyes, 638 S.W.2d 957, 960 (Tex. App.Eastland 1982, no writ).
64. See Alvarado v. State, 656 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 1983, no
writ)(dismissing appeal because appeal bond filed in appellate rather than trial court).
65. TEX. R. APP. P. 41(a)(l).
66. The inclusion of the phrase "by any party" in rule 40 was intended to eliminate the
rule of Neuhoff Bros. Packers v. Acosta, 327 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex. 1959) which prohibited
reliance on motions filed by another party in calculating appellate deadlines. 6 W. DORSANEO,
TEXAS CIVIL LITIGATION § 142.01[3] (1988).
67. TEX. R. ApP. P. 41(a)(l). In an appeal from an interlocutory order, the bond or
substitute must be filed no later than 20 days after the order is signed by the trial court. TEX.
R. APP. P. 41(a)(2). Motions for new trial are not permitted on appeals from interlocutory
orders; thus, such a motion would not enlarge deadlines. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42(a)(1).
68. 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 563 (Tex. Practice 1985).
69. TEX. R. APP. P. 41(c) (no appeal bond or affidavit in lieu thereof, notice of appeal, or
notice of limitation of appeal shall be held ineffective because prematurely filed); see TEX. R.
APp. P. 58(a) (proceedings relating to appeal not ineffective because of prematurity if subsequent appellate order signed to which premature proceeding is applicable); see also Ragsdale v.
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tute is not a nullity; it is considered to have been filed on the day of
but subsequent to the date of the signing of the judgment or the order
overruling a motion for new trial.7 0
The Texas Supreme Court has stressed that virtually any sort of
instrument filed by the appellant which is intended to act as a cost
bond or deposit will invoke appellate jurisdiction and perfect the appeal.71 Rule 46 provides that when there is a defect of substance or
form in the bond or deposit, then on motion to dismiss the appeal
based on such defects, the appellate court may allow the filing of a
new bond or deposit.7 2 The rule providing for defective bonds and
deposits to be amended is liberally construed in favor of the perfection
of appeals 73 and the assumption of appellate jurisdiction. 74 The appellate court's jurisdiction is invoked by the timely filing of the bond or
deposit even though the instrument is defective. 75 Only if the appellant fails to remedy the defects should the appeal be dismissed.7 6
The initial due date for filing an affidavit in lieu of cost bond on
appeal is the same as for other documents used to perfect an appeal.7 7
Involvement in an appeal in which such an affidavit is filed, however,
requires counsel to face one of the more confusing aspects of appellate
deadline calculations with a variety of "short fuse" mandatory time
constraints imposed on both appellant and appellee.
Progressive Voters League, 730 S.W.2d 176, 177-78 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987)(granting motion to apply cost bond filed on premature appeal of interlocutory nonappealable order to
subsequent appeal of appealable order). See generally 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 563 (Tex. Practice 1985).

70. TEX. R. APP. P. 41(c).
71. See Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Arkla Equip. Co., 528 S.W.2d 568, 570
(Tex. 1975).
72. TEX. R. ApP. P. 46(f).
73. Woods Exploration & Producing Co., 528 S.W.2d at 570; see Jinkins v. Bryan, 733
S.W.2d 268, 268-69 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987)(denying motion to dismiss and discussing
Texas cases indicative of liberal construction of defective bonds and deposits).
74. See Jinkins, 733 S.W.2d at 268-69 (denying motion to dismiss and observing under
rule 46(f) "appellate court is not easily denied").
75. See Pollak v. Metroplex Consumer Center, Inc., 722 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. App.Dallas 1986)(vacating order of dismissal and reinstating appeal); see also Smith v. Valdez, 737
S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987)(conditionally granting motion to dismiss but
holding even if bond defective, dismissal of appeal not required).
76. See Valdez, 737 S.W.2d at 142-43 (conditionally granting motion to dismiss).
77. See TEX. R. APP. P. 40(a)(l). While the rule indicates that notice must be given after
filing, the Texas Supreme Court has indicated that advance notification of an intent to perfect
an appeal by affidavit will suffice. See Jones v. Stayman, 747 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. 1987). See
generally O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE
PRACTICE COURSE C-36 (1988).
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Not only must the affidavit be filed within the time period specified
for filing a cost bond, but notice must be given of that filing to opposing parties and the court reporter within two days after filing.7" As
numerous appellants have discovered to their dismay, the failure to
comply with the two-day notice provision renders the affidavit a nullity and requires the appellant to pay costs on appeal or post security. 79 Since the usual reason for filing the affidavit in the first place is
because appellant is too poor to pay for appellate costs, non-compliance with the mandatory two-day notice provision generally terminates the litigant's attempt to obtain the appellate relief 8 0
On the other hand, once the affidavit has been timely filed and
proper notice provided, the appellee is faced with a number of strict
deadlines. Rule 40(a)(3)(C) requires any contest to be filed within ten
days after the contestant receives notice of the filing of the affidavit of
inability." If no contest is filed within that ten-day period, "the allegations of the affidavit shall be taken as true" and the appellant shall
be permitted to appeal as an indigent."2
Rule 40(a)(3)(E) also states if no ruling is made on a timely filed
contest within ten days after its filing, "the allegations of the affidavit
shall be taken as true."8 " Texas courts have uniformly held that when

78. TEX. R. APP. P. 40(a)(3)(B). If service by mail is being used, the notice must be
mailed the day before the due date, not on the due date. See Fellowship Missionary Baptist
Church v. Sigel, 749 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ)(dismissing appeal for
inadequate notice to court reporter).
79. See, e.g., In re V.G., 746 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no
writ)(dismissing appeal); Villareal v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 742 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ)(appeal dismissed); Furr v. Furr, 721 S.W.2d 565, 566
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ)(overruling motion to extend deadline for filing affidavit).
Timely notice must be given to both the opposing party and the court reporter. See Matlock v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 729 S.W.2d 960, 960 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ)(court of
appeals lacked jurisdiction where appellant notified appellee's attorney of affidavit but failed to
notify court reporter).
80. The Texas Supreme Court has emphasized recently that the indigency notice provisions should be liberally construed in favor of the right to appeal. See Jones v. Stayman, 747
S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. 1987). The appellant's failure to comply with rule 40 may be waived by
a court reporter or opposing party who has the opportunity to object to deficient notice but
fails to do so. See id.
81. Any interested officer of the court, such as the clerk, and not just the reporter or
opposing party, has standing to file a contest. See 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE
PROCEDURE § 559 (Tex. Practice 1985); O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF
TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-36 (1988).
82. TEX. R. ApP. P. 40(a)(3)(E).
83. TEX. R. APP. P. 40(a)(3)(E). The trial judge, however, is authorized to extend the
time for a hearing and ruling by filing a signed written order within the ten day period. Id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University,

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 20 [], No. 1, Art. 1

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:1

the contestant fails to obtain a ruling within a ten-day period, a con4
test is automatically and irrevocably overruled by operation of law.
In Beatty v. Martin,85 after describing that ten-day rule as having "no
exceptions and is in the nature of a jurisdictional requirement,"8 6 the
court held:
In summary, the trial court was without authority to act on the contest
to the affidavit of inability to pay costs any time after the ten day period
of Rule 355(e) [now appellate rule 40] has expired. Therefore, the order
sustaining the contest8 7 to the affidavit is a nullity and Relator is entitled
to Mandamus relief.

Simply stated, a contestant loses "the contest automatically if it is
not ruled on in ten days."88 Rule 40(a)(3) is drawn by the supreme
court in mandatory terms and does not provide the trial court with
any discretion whatsoever; if the court does not rule on the contest
within ten days after the contest is filed, the allegations of the affidavit
must be taken as true.89 If the trial judge attempts to rule on the
contest after the expiration of the ten day period, that ruling is void.90
Moreover, an oral pronouncement that the contest is sustained or a
docket entry within the ten-day period is not valid as an order sustaining the contest. 9 ' In the absence of a written order sustaining the
contest signed within ten days of the filing of the contest, it is conclusively presumed that the affidavit of inability was sustained. 92
That strict ten-day period for obtaining a rule governs cases in
The judge may not extend the time for more than twenty additional days after the extension
order. Id.
84. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Penfold, 699 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, orig.
proc.); Beatty v. Martin, 690 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, orig. proc); Guetersloh
Grain, Inc. v. Wright, 618 S.W.2d 135, 136 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
85. 690 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, orig. proc.).
86. Id. at 95.
87. Id.
88. Guetersloh Grain, 618 S.W.2d at 136 n.3.
89. Id.; accord Beatty, 690 S.W.2d at 95; Alvarez, 699 S.W.2d at 620.
90. See Alvarez, 699 S.W.2d at 629; Lopez v. Foremost Paving, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 614,
615-16 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984)(granting extension motion, denying dismissal
motions).
91. See Modem Living, Inc. v. Alworth, 730 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1987, orig. proc.)(neither oral pronouncement nor docket entry sufficient as "[o]nly a written
signed order is effective").
92. See, e.g., id. at 446; Alvarez, 699 S.W.2d at 620; Beatty, 690 S.W.2d at 95; Guetersloh
Grain, Inc. v. Wright, 618 S.W.2d 135, 136 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
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which multiple contests are filed. 93 As one court concluded, "the filing of the first contest fixes the time within which the trial court must
rule by written order."94 In other words, any contest filed after the
initial contest does not trigger an additional ten-day period.
Thus, it is critical for counsel seeking to contest an affidavit of inability: (1) to verify that appellant complied with the two-day notice
provision; (2) to file a contest within ten days after notice of filing of
the affidavit; and (3) to have the contest heard and sustained by written order within ten days of filing of the contest or within the time
period as timely extended by the court.
When a contest is filed, it delays the perfection of the appeal until
the contest is overruled. If the court overrules the contest, then the
appeal is viewed as having been perfected at the time the affidavit was
filed." If the court sustains the contest, the appellant has ten days
from that date to file a bond or cash deposit and the appeal is perfected when the bond or deposit is filed.96 If the trial court finds that
the affidavit was not made in good faith, however, then appellant may
be denied the right to file a bond. 97
The use of short absolute deadlines when an affidavit of inability is
filed is justified on policy grounds. When an appellant is attempting
to proceed as a pauper, other appellate deadlines continue to run during the time the right to a free appeal is being contested.9 8 A prompt
resolution of the right to appeal as an indigent is a primary policy
underlying rule 40(a)(3). As the Dallas Court of Appeals has
observed:

93. See Del Castillo v. Lowry, 698 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1985, orig. proc.).
94. Id. at 368.
95. O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE
PRACTICE COURSE C-38 (1988).

96. TEX. R. APP. P. 41(a)(2). Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to challenge sustaining of affidavit of inability to pay appellate costs. Allred v. Lowrey, 597 S.W.2d 353, 354
n.2 (Tex. 1980).
97. TEX. R. APP.P. 41(a)(2); see Marshall v. Miller, 707 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. App.Dallas 1986, orig. proc.)(upholding trial court's finding of lack of good faith based on proof
that appellant owned assets worth hundreds of thousands of dollars).
98. See Howell v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 710 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex. App.Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(rules governing timetable for filing record operate independently
of those rules governing the pauper's affidavit contest), cert. denied, _ U.S. _ 107 S. Ct.
1898, 95 L. Ed. 2d 505 (1987); Garrity v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 664 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(although contest to pauper's affidavit prevented clerk
from preparing transcript until after hearing, appellant still required to seek extension of time).
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It appears, however, that the supreme court, by its use of mandatory
language in Rule 355(e), has cast the balance in favor of assuring that
an indigent who desires to appeal, and must therefore always be mindful of the various appellate timetables which are prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction, quickly learn whether he may appeal as a pauper or
pay costs. The supreme court has put an absolute limit on the time for
which an indigent must await a final decision on his affidavit while the
appellate time tables [sic] continue to run against him.9 9

C. Supersedeas Bond: Preventing Execution or Enforcement of the
Judgment
Texas law does not provide a deadline for filing a supersedeas

bond."°

It may be filed at any time during the pendency of the

appeal. 101

The appellant may file a supersedeas bond or deposit which includes an amount sufficient to not only stay enforcement of the judgment but to cover the amount of the cost bond.102 When the
supersedeas bond is designed to fulfill the dual function of staying
execution of the judgment and perfecting the appeal, 10 3 however, it
must be filed within the deadline for filing the cost bond on appeal.
Even in situations where the supersedeas bond was probably not intended by appellant's counsel to act as an appeal bond, courts have
99. Beatty v. Martin, 690 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, orig. proc.).
100. See J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 605 (Tex. Practice
1985)(no prescribed time in statutes and rules within which cash deposit or supersedeas bond
must be filed to be effective); accord Keltner, Post-Judgment Remedies, in STATE BAR OF
TEXAS, ADVANCED PERSONAL INJURY COURSE BB-17 (1987)(failure to post supersedeas

bond within cost bond time period not fatal to right to supersede).
101. See 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 605 (Tex. Practice

1985); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47(a) (essentially providing for suspension of enforcement of
judgments at any time after rendition of judgment). Not all judgments may be superseded.
See Bracken, Mechanics of Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE: APPELLATE PRACTICE D-13 (1986); 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE

§ 604 (Tex. Practice 1985). Also, governmental entities which are exempt from cost bond
requirements supersede an adverse judgment by filing a notice of appeal. See Ammex Warehouse Co. v. Archer, 381 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex. 1964). See generally Townsend & Duncan,
Stay of Judgment, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE

(1987)(detailed discussion of staying enforcement of judgments).
102. See 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 606 (Tex. Practice

1985).
103. See Fort Bend Indep. School Dist. v. Weiss, 570 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston (1st Dist.] 1978, no writ); Pope & McConnico, PracticingLaw with the 1981 Texas
Rules, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 457, 505 (1981).
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declined to dismiss appeals for want of jurisdiction, holding that the
supersedeas bond was sufficient to perfect the appeal. 0 4 Those courts
have reasoned that a supersedeas bond obligating the appellant to perform the judgment and pay all costs is in legal effect a bond for costs
as well.10 5
If there is a possibility that the appellee will attempt to execute on
the judgment, a supersedeas bond should be filed before the clerk is
authorized to issue a writ of execution. If a motion for new trial is not
filed, the clerk is entitled to issue a writ of execution within thirty
days after the signing of the judgment. 0 6 However, if a motion for
new trial is filed, the clerk cannot issue the writ for thirty days after
the motion is overruled by written order or by operation of law.' 0
Thus, while the law does not provide a specific due date, the practical
deadline for filing a supersedeas bond usually is no later than thirty
days after the last to occur of the signing of the judgment or the overruling of the motion for new trial. If a writ of execution has already
been issued by the time appellant files a supersedeas bond, then the
clerk must at once issue a writ of supersedeas staying all further proceedings under any execution previously issued.10
D.

The Record on Appeal
1. In General

The record on appeal consists of the transcript and the statement of
facts."' 9 The statement of facts consists of the court reporter's tran104. See, e.g., Cooper v. Bowser, 583 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1979, no writ); Weiss, 570 S.W.2d at 243; Durham v. Fort Worth Tent & Awning Co., 271
S.W.2d 181, 182-83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ dism'd).

105. See Jones v. Banks, 331 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1960, no writ).
As the court stated in Garvin v. Hufft, 243 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), "a supersedeas bond is, in form and effect, an appeal bond and when ...

filed

effectively stays further proceedings by the trial court and confers potential jurisdiction on the
Court of Civil Appeals." Accord Salas v. Gonzalez, 181 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-

San Antonio 1944, no writ).
106. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 627.
107. See id. Under certain circumstances, execution may be commenced prior to the
expiration of the thirty day periods such as when the appellee proves that the appellant is
about to secrete or remove property subject to execution. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 628.

108. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 634. Thus, if a cost bond on appeal was initially filed, followed
by an attempt by the appellee to execute on the judgment, a supersedeas bond can then be filed

to stay enforcement of the judgment. See Cashion v. Cashion, 239 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1951, no writ).
109. TEX. R. App. P. 51(a); see Keltner, Post-Judgment Remedies, in STATE BAR OF
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scription of the testimony, oral trial motions, objections, rulings, exhibits, as well as the voir dire and jury arguments if specifically
requested.110 A transcript is composed of papers filed with the district
clerk with the matters included generally being dependent upon selection by the parties.'
Filing the record is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review. 112 However, a transcript is essential in every appeal. 13 Without a transcript, there is no judgment for the appellate court to
review."14 In contrast to the transcript, a statement of facts is not
indispensable in all appeals.11 ' Certain appeals can be resolved solely
on the papers in the transcript such as when the question on appeal is
purely one of law, while in other cases such as summary judgment
!6
proceeding, statement of facts are not permitted."
The record on appeal must be filed in the court of appeals within
sixty days after signing of the judgment." 7 If a motion for new trial

or motion to vacate, modify or correct the judgment is timely filed by
BB-19 (1987)(appellate record consists of
two separate items, transcript and statement of facts).
110. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52(c)(10) (anything occurring in open court or in chambers
may be included in statement of facts although costs of jury arguments and voir dire to be
taxed against requesting party).
111. See 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 633 (Tex. Practice
1985).
112. See TEX. R. APP. P. 54(a) (failure to timely file transcript or statement of facts does
not affect appellate court's jurisdiction).
113. See Parks-Davis Auctioneers, Inc. v. L & W Tong Serv., Inc., 496 S.W.2d 679, 681
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ)(appeal cannot be pursued without transcript).
114. 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 632 (Tex. Practice Supp.
1987)(without transcript appellate court will dismiss the appeal or affirm the trial court's judgment); see 6 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 143.08 (1988)(discussing procedure
for dismissing appeal for lack of transcript). Thus, the fact that the absence of a transcript is
not a jurisdictional defect does not alter the ultimate result; a party attempting to appeal without a transcript will always lose. See 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE
§ 632 (Tex. Practice 1985).
115. See generally O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-46, C-64 to C-70 (1988)(discussing circumstances
when statement of facts necessary).
116. See generally id. at C-69, C-70 (discussing when statement of facts not needed for
appellate review). Without a statement of facts, appellate courts are generally limited to complaints involving errors of law, erroneous pleadings, improper jury charge, irreconcilable jury
findings and fundamental error. Collins v. Williamson Printing Corp., 746 S.W.2d 489, 491
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
117. TEX. R. APP. P. 54(a). The record will be deemed timely if filed on or before the due
date even though the filing fee is paid late. See Longline v. Corpus Christi Lodge No. 189, 730
S.W.2d 208, 209 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987)(denying motion to dismiss appeal).
TEXAS, ADVANCED PERSONAL INJURY COURSE
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any party, then the record must be filed within 120 days after the

judgment is signed. 1 8
The failure to file the transcript or the statement of facts within the
required time represents a ground for dismissing the appeal, disregarding untimely filed materials, affirming the judgment or applying

presumptions against the appellant.

9

The court of appeals has no

authority to consider an untimely filed transcript or statement of

facts. 120
A formal request or designation by the appellant is unnecessary to
institute the preparation of the transcript.'21 Under rule 5 1, the filing
of a cost bond on appeal or its substitute automatically imposes the
burden on the clerk to prepare a transcript and transmit it directly to
the court of appeals.' 22 That rule, however, does not require the clerk
to transmit the transcript for filing before its due date, or even to complete it on time. Thus, the ultimate burden to properly place the rec23
ord before the court of appeals remains entirely with the appellant.
When the appeal is perfected, rule 51 requires the clerk to include
certain matters in the transcript. They are: (1) the live pleadings
upon which trial was held; (2) the charge of the court and the verdict

of the jury or court's findings of fact and conclusions of law; (3) the
trial court's judgment or the order being appealed; (4) any motions for
new trial and orders of the court thereon; (5) the cost bond on appeal

or substitute; (6) any notice of limitation of appeal; (7) any bills of
118. See TEX. R. APP. P. 54(a). In an appeal by writ of error, the record must be filed
within 60 days after the writ of error is perfected. See id. While in an interlocutory appeal, the
record has to be filed within 30 days after the signing of the judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P.
42(a)(3).
119. TEX. R. APP. P. 54(a).
120. Id.; see B.D. Click Co. v. Safari Drilling Corp., 638 S.W.2d 860, 861-62 (Tex. 1982).
121. Bracken, Mechanics ofAppeal, in
D-15 (1986).

STATE BAR OF TEXAS, PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE:

APPELLATE PRACTICE

122. See TEX. R. APP. P. 51(c). "Upon perfection of the appeal, the clerk of the trial
court shall prepare ... and immediately transmit the transcript to the appellate court designated by the appellant." Id. (emphasis added).
123. Nix v. Fraze, 752 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ)(affirming
summary judgment in clerk's favor in action based on allegedly negligent failure to timely
transmit transcript to appellate court). In Nix, the court stressed: "[i]t is the appellant and
not the clerk of the trial court, who desires to prosecute the appeal." Id. at 120; accord Attorney General of Texas v. Segree, 694 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no
writ)(while rule places burden on clerk to prepare and transmit transcript to appellate court,
appealing party still has responsibility to see that all rules prescribing time limits are followed);
see also TEX. R. APP. P. 50(a) (burden on appellant to bring forward sufficient record to show
error requiring reversal).
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exception; and (8) a certified bill1 2of
costs, including the cost of the
4
facts.
of
statement
and
transcript
Unless the clerk is instructed otherwise, those papers listed in rule
51 are the only items that will be included in the transcript.'25 If
counsel needs other documents to support or defeat an appeal, then
those documents must be specifically requested by filing a written
designation with the clerk before the deadline for perfecting the
26
appeal. 1

Unlike the clerk who has a mandatory duty to prepare the transcript upon perfection of the appeal, the court reporter is not required
to begin the statement of facts simply because a cost bond or its substitute has been filed. Rather, the rules place an affirmative burden on
the appellant to request the court reporter to begin work. Under rule
53, the appealing party, "at or before the time prescribed for perfecting the appeal," must make a written request to the official reporter
designating those portions of the evidence and other proceedings to be
included. 127 A copy of that request must be filed with the clerk of the
trial court 28 and served on the appellee, who has ten days after service of the appellant's request to designate additional matters for in129
clusion in the statement of facts.
As is the case with filing the transcript, the appealing party has sole
responsibility for ensuring that the statement of facts is filed on
time. 13 If the statement of facts is not timely filed and an extension
of time is not timely requested and granted by the appellate court,
then none of the evidence in the statement of facts can be considered
124. TEX. R. APP. P. 51(a).
125. See O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-4 (1988)(without instructions from parties, clerk will prepare
"bare bones" transcript).

126. See TEX. R. APP. P. 51(b). Filing a written designation is advisable since district
clerks do not interpret rule 51(c) in a consistent fashion. Also, most appeals require a more
comprehensive record than the documents listed in that rule. See Keltner, Post-Judgment
Remedies, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED PERSONAL INJURY COURSE BB-20 (1987).

127. TEX. R. APP. P. 53(a); see Ameriphone, Inc. v. Tex-Net, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 777, 77778 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987)(denying motion to extend deadline for filing statement of
facts and holding that filing request with clerk and notifying court reporter by telephone, not

in writing, did not comply with rule 53(a)).
128. See TEX. R. ApP. P. 53(a).
129. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53(b).
130. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53(k); see also Olivares v. States, 693 S.W.2d 486, 489 n.l (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ)("it is appellant's burden to timely file a statement of
facts").
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on appeal.13
While the statement of facts is customarily prepared by the court
reporter in question and answer form, 132 there are other methods of
memorializing trials. Each of those methods invokes certain
deadlines.
If the appellant requests the court reporter to prepare a partial
statement of facts under rule 53(d), the request must include a list of
the points of error on appeal. 33 Once the appellant has requested the
partial statement of facts, the appellee has ten days after being served
34
with that request to ask for additional material to be included.
When the appellant correctly follows the procedure for requesting a
partial statement of facts, then the presumption on appeal is that
nothing omitted from the record is relevant to the appeal. 135 The failure to strictly comply with the procedure for requesting a partial
statement of facts can be fatal to an appeal because the appellate court
will presume the omitted portions of the statement of facts supported
the judgment of the trial court - a presumption virtually impossible
36
to overcome.

131. As Justice Keltner has observed:
The Southwestern Reporters are literally full of cases which decline to take actions on
appellate points of error because the statement of facts is not included. As a result, the
timely filing and proper request for the statement of facts are potential pitfalls which will
wreck an appeal.
Keltner, Post-Judgment Remedies, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED PERSONAL INJURY

COURSE BB-20 (1987).
132. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53(i).
133. TEX. R. APP. P. 53(d). Requesting a partial statement of facts is not the same as
limiting the scope of an appeal under rule 40(a). That rule permits the appellant to limit his

appeal to specifically designated legal issues. See Storey, The Appellate Process, in SOUTH
TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW, THE APPELLATE PRACTICE INSTITUTE E-19 (1988)(advising
counsel not to confuse limiting record under rule 53 with limiting issues under rule 40(a)).
The notice of limitation of appeal must be served on adverse parties within fifteen days after
the judgment is signed, or within seventy-five days thereafter, if a motion for new trial is filed.
TEX. R. APP. P. 40(a)(4). The adverse party then has at least fifteen days in which to perfect a
separate appeal. See Patrick and Watkins, Limited & Cross Appeals, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE F-7 (1988).
134. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53(b), (d).

135. See TEX. R. ApP. P. 53(d); see also Phaup v. Boswell, 731 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ)(rejecting argument that erroneous exclusion of evidence was harmless and stressing appellee's failure to request additional portions of evidence
after appellant requested partial statement of facts).
136. Most reported decisions discussing the procedure for appealing based on a partial
statement of facts involve appellants who failed to comply with rule 53(d) and lost as a result
of that failure. See, e.g., Ball v. Farm & Home Say. Ass'n, 747 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. App.-
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Instead of requesting the usual "Q & A" statement of facts, a party
is authorized to prepare and file with the clerk of the trial court a
condensed statement, in narrative form, of some or all of the testimony." s7 The deadline for filing a narrative is the same as for filing a
statement of facts in question and answer form. The opposing party,
if dissatisfied with the narrative statement may, within ten days after
receipt, require testimony be produced in question and answer form
13 8
for all or part of the narrative.
As an alternative to a statement of facts, the parties may agree on a
brief statement of the case. 1 39 An agreed statement has the same
filing deadline as a statement of facts."4 That agreed statement, how14
ever, is not filed separately, but is filed as part of the transcript. 1
If a party files a defective statement of facts or transcript, the opposing party must file a motion to strike the defective record within
thirty days or any error is waived.142 Of course, if the appellate court
lacks jurisdiction due to the defect, that defect cannot be waived by a
failure to file a motion to dismiss within thirty days. 14

Fort Worth 1988, no writ); DeLeon v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Corpus Christi, 694 S.W.2d
381, 382 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Constr. Group, Inc. v.
City of Pasadena, 663 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1983, writ dism'd);
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Forscan Corp., 641 S.W.2d 311, 316-17 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1982, no writ); see also Thompson v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 708 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(reversing in part despite appellant's failure to comply with
procedure for requesting partial statement of facts). Other than addressing the applicable
deadlines, a detailed analysis of the technical and confusing procedure for requesting a partial
statement of facts is not within the ambit of this article. See generally 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL
TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 639 (Tex. Practice 1985).
137. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53(i); See generally O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE
BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-58 (1988)(recommending
against appealing with narrative statement of facts because virtually impossible to successfully
attack sufficiency of evidence under such record).
138. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53(i).
139. See TEX. R. APP. P. 50(c).
140. See TEX. R. APP. P. 54(a) (setting out filing deadline for statement of facts).
141. See TEX. R. ApP. P. 50(c). See generally O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE
BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-58 (1988); 31 J. WICKER,
CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 648 (Tex. Practice 1985).
142. See TEX. R. APP. P. 71 (motions relating to informalities in the record shall be filed
within 30 days after transcript filed).
143. See TEX. R. APP. P. 72 (court may entertain motions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction more than 30 days after transcript filed); see also Tullow v. Eaton Corp., 695 S.W.2d 568,
568 (Tex. 1985)jurisdiction can be raised at any time).
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2.

Problems and Peculiarities Connected with Filing the Record

a.

Timely Requesting the Record

As discussed previously, at or before the time prescribed for
perfecting the appeal, the appellant must make a written request to
the official court reporter to prepare the statement of facts. The dual
requirement of timely requesting and filing the statement of facts
often has proved troublesome for appellate counsel.
If the appellant misses the deadline for requesting the statement of
facts, and the court reporter could have completed the statement of
facts on time had a proper request been made, the appellate court
should refuse to file the statement of facts. 1" On the other hand, the
significance of an untimely request to the court reporter should become moot if the statement of facts is prepared and filed on time despite the late request. 145 Likewise, if the appellant cannot reasonably
explain a delay in requesting the reporter to start work, the court
should nevertheless accept the statement of facts for filing when the
144. See Winston Int'l Elec., Inc. v. Rio Radio Supply, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 161, 162 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(dismissing appeal when delay in requesting
statement of facts not reasonably explained); Monk v. Dallas Brake & Clutch Serv. Co., 683
S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984)(granting extension motion but observing that appellant who makes untimely request causing statement of facts to be late must be prepared to
explain delay). See generally 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 644
(Tex. Practice 1985).
145. See In re Phillips, 691 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985)(refusing to
dismiss appeal when statement of facts filed on time although request for preparation late);
Monk, 683 S.W.2d at 109 (late request of no consequence if statement of facts timely filed).
Prior to the adoption of the appellate rules, Texas courts had differed sharply on the impact of
an untimely request to the court reporter. At least one court had held that the requirement of
a timely request was absolute; therefore, a late request deprived the appellate court of the
power to file a timely-tendered statement of facts. See Odom v. Olafson, 675 S.W.2d 581, 582
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ dism'd). Other courts had essentially concluded that an
untimely request should be considered as a ground for denying an extension motion only if the
late request caused the statement of facts to be late. See Monk, 683 S.W.2d at 108-09; see also
Adams v. H.R. Management and La Plaza Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 256, 257-58 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1985)(refusing to construe rule requiring timely request to court reporter as absolute
where record showed that timely request would not have resulted in timely filed statement of
facts). Courts and commentators have generally concluded that rule 54(c) eliminates the controversy by permitting a motion to extend the time for filing a statement of facts to be granted
despite a delay in making the written request so long as the appellant reasonably explains the
delay. See Container Port Serv., Inc. v. Gage, 719 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1986)(granting extension of time to file record); Bracken, Mechanics of Appeal, in STATE BAR
OF TEXAS, PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE: APPELLATE PRACTICE D-22 (1986); 6 W. DORSANEO,

TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 143.08 (1988).
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record demonstrates that even if the request had been timely, the
court reporter could not have completed the transcription on time.' 46
There seems little reason to deny the appellant the right to file a statement of facts due to a late request when a timely request would not
have resulted in a timely filed statement of facts. I47 On the other
hand, a more harsh result is perhaps warranted if the court reporter
could have completed the statement of facts within thirty days after
the time for perfecting an appeal had appellant made a timely request.
The deadline for the statement of facts in the court of appeals is no
later than thirty days after the deadline for perfecting the appeal.
Thus, if the statement of facts is requested at the last possible moment, the court reporter will have only thirty days in which to prepare it. Unless the trial was relatively brief, or the reporter's
workload is unusually light, a court reporter will rarely be able to
dictate and transcribe the notes of the trial within such a short time
period.148 Even if the statement of facts cannot be completed on time
because the appellant has delayed the request until the last minute
allowed by the rules, any unreasonable procrastination in asking the
reporter to begin work cannot be relied on by an appellate court to
refuse to file the statement of facts.' 49 So long as the request was
made prior to the time for perfecting the appeal, that request is timely
as a matter of law.150
b. Appeals by Indigents
Another tricky aspect of complying with record deadlines involves
appeals in which the appellant's affidavit of inability to pay appellate
costs has been contested.'
The rules concerning contests of affida146. See Adams, 696 S.W.2d at 257-58 (holding that late request to court reporter did not
warrant denying extension motion because delay in request was reasonably explained and did
not cause late filing of statement of facts); see also ContainerPort Serv., 719 S.W.2d at 665
(granting extension motion when court reporter's affidavit demonstrated it would have been
impossible to prepare statement of facts by deadline even if appellate counsel had made timely

request).
147. See Adams, 696 S.W.2d at 257-5 8 (granting motion to reconsider denial of extension

of time to file statement of facts).
148. Sumner & Greener v. Carlson, 739 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth

1987)(appellate rules create time bind that has plagued courts for years).
149. Id. at 129.
150. See id. (refusing to adopt rule denying extension motion when appellant delayed
requesting a record until the last possible day).
151. See 6 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 143.08 (1988)(rules concerning
timely filing of record create "procedural dilemma" for indigent appellants).
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vits operate independently of the timetable governing the filing of the
record.' 52 Litigation over the right to appeal as an indigent does not
53
toll the deadline for filing the statement of facts or the transcript.
Often the appellant will not know whether he will be allowed to proceed as an indigent until after the due date for filing the record. As a
practical matter, the statement of facts is usually not complete and
ready for filing on time when the appellant's affidavit has been contested because court reporters are understandably reluctant to work
on a record which will not be used and for which they will not be paid
if the contest is sustained. If the pauper's affidavit is being contested
and the statement of facts or transcript will not be ready for timely
filing, the appellant must file a motion to extend the deadline for filing
the record although the appeal technically remains unperfected. 5 4
c.

Electronic Statements of Facts

By order dated January 28, 1986, the Texas Supreme Court estab-

lished a pilot project for the district courts of Dallas County to study
the use of electronic recording systems in civil proceedings and elec-

tronic statements of facts for appeals.' 55 The avowed purpose of the
order is to "determine if significant reductions can be made in the
time required for appellate procedures and the cost thereof .... 56
The statement of facts on appeal from any proceeding in which an
152. Howell v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 710 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex. App.Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, - U.S. _ 107 S. Ct. 1898, 95 L. Ed. 2d 505
(1987).
153. See id. "The pauper's right to a free statement of facts on appeal does not alleviate
the pauper's responsibilities of moving forward in the appealing process or of complying with
other requirements of appeal prescribed in the rules of civil procedure." Id.
154. See id. at 732-33; accord Garrity v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 664 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(request for extension of time for record required
although preparation of transcript not complete).
155. Rowlett v. Colortek, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987)(granting
motion for clarification of supreme court's order). The complete text of the January 8, 1986
order is set out in the appendix to the opinion in Darley v. Texas Uvatan, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 200,
204-05 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987)(granting extension of time to file brief). On April 15, 1988,
the supreme court issued an order permitting the creation of an identical pilot project in Bexar
County. Tex. Sup. Ct. Order (April 15, 1988). To date, that project has not been funded by
Bexar County. The court is considering a similar order throughout the state which would give
trial courts the option of using a stenographic or electronic record. Baker & Smith, Simplifying Appellate Procedure.: A Proposal to Turn Management of Court Reporters Over to the
Courts, 7 THE ADVOCATE 12, 13 (State Bar of Texas 1988).
156. See Order of Supreme Court of Texas, January 8, 1986 (published in Appendix of
Darley v. Texas Uvatan, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 200, 204-06 Tex. App.-Dallas 1987).
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electronic tape recording has been made consists of the audio cassette
tapes of the trial court proceedings, a copy of the typewritten and
original logs filed in the case certified by the court reporter, the exhibits filed with the clerk and a descriptive list of the exhibits.'" 7 Those
items must be filed with the court of appeals within fifteen days of the
perfection of the appeal; 5 ' therefore, the filing deadline is forty-five
days after the signing of the judgment or 105 days after judgment if a
motion for new trial has been filed.' 5 9 The deadline for filing a statement of facts in an appeal under the pilot project thus is different than
in a typical appeal. No other deadlines in the appellate rules were
changed by the order creating the pilot project. 60
Section V of the supreme court's order states: "[e]ach party shall
file with his brief an appendix containing a written transcription of all
portions of the recorded statement of facts and a copy of all exhibits
relevant to the error asserted."' 6' Although the appendix will contain
the record of the trial proceedings which counsel are accustomed to
having included in the statement of facts, that appendix is not the
statement of facts in an appeal under the pilot project - the tapes,
log, exhibits and exhibit list are the statement of facts. 62 The appendix is considered to be part of the appellant's brief and subject to163the
deadline for filing the brief, not for filing the statement of facts.
At or before the time for perfecting an appeal, the appealing party
should request transcription of the portions of the recorded statement
of facts relevant to the error asserted. '1 The Dallas Court of Appeals
157. Id. § 3(a)-(c); see also Darley v. Texas Uvatan, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 200, 201-02 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1987)(discussing parts comprising statement of facts for pilot project in Dallas

County district courts).
158. See Tex. Sup. Ct. Order § 4 (January 28, 1986); see Darley v. Texas Uvatan, Inc.,
754 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. App. -Dallas 1988, no writ) (duty to timely file statement of facts
under pilot project is joint obligation of court reporter and counsel).
159. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41(a)(l) (establishing deadlines for perfecting appeal).
160. See Tex. Sup. Ct. Order § 4 (January 29, 1986).
161. See id. § 5.
162. See Darley, 741 S.W.2d at 202.
163. See id. at 202-03. Rule 53(a) is applicable to appeals governed by the pilot project in
Dallas. See Darley v. Texas Uvatan, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no
writ) (appellant violated rule 53(a) by failing to make written request to official court reporter
and instead making oral request to "audio librarian").
164. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53(a) (at or before time for perfecting appeal, appellant must
make written request to the court reporter designating those matters to be included in statement of facts). Although the rules require six copies of appellant's brief to be filed in the court
of appeals, six copies of the appendix are not automatically required. If the portion of the
audio record which has been transcribed is lengthy, only one appendix need be filed. See
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has observed pointedly that "nothing in the Order mandates that only
the official court reporter prepare the appendix."16' 5 Consequently, if
an appeal is based on an electronic statement of facts, the appellant
may append to his brief a transcription of the electronic record prepared by someone other than the court reporter. 1 6 6 The fact that persons other than the official court reporter are permitted to transcribe
the electronic record could become critical if an extension of time to
file the brief is needed because the appendix is not ready. In that
situation, merely proving that the workload of the presiding court reporter precluded timely filing of the appendix will be insufficient to
persuade the appellate court to grant an extension without an additional showing that it was not possible for another reporter to have
167
prepared the appendix on time.
The fact that only a portion of the electronic record is transcribed
does not transform the appeal into one being taken on a partial statement of facts under Rule 53(d) so long as the complete electronic
statement of facts has been timely filed. 168 Under the pilot project, the
court of appeals presumes that nothing omitted from the transcriptions and the appendices is relevant to the appeal. 169 If the appellee is
not satisfied that the appendix filed with the appellant's brief adequately presents the appeal, then the appellee should request the transcription of those portions of the electronic record which demonstrate
that appellant's points lack merit. Again, any delay associated with
additional transcriptions will involve a motion to extend briefing

Lauterbach v. Lieber Enter., Inc., 754 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988) (granting
motion to file one copy of electronic record).
165. See Darley, 741 S.W.2d at 203.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 203-04 (excusing appellant's failure to hire someone other than court reporter to transcribe electronic record based on parties' confusion over supreme court order).
There is no provision in the rules for the time a request must be made to someone other than
the official court reporter to transcribe the trial proceedings. Presumably, it would be governed by appellate rule 53(a). See generally TEX. R. App. P. 53(a). Also, if the Darley court's
opinion is read literally, counsel can select anyone, regardless of qualifications, to transcribe
the recordings. The potential for inaccurate, garbled or even fraudulent transcription warrants
placing limitations on the persons counsel can select to transcribe the record. See Pogue v.
Duncan, 753 S.W.2d 255, 256-57 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ). "It seems quite obvious to
us that the legislature was aware of the necessity of providing the highest trial courts of this
State with competent court reporters so that accurate recordings of trial proceedings could be
made." Id.
168. See Rowlett v. Colortek, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 206, 207-08 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987).
169. See Tex. Sup. Ct. Order § 6 (January 28, 1986); see also Rowlett, 741 S.W.2d at 208.
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deadlines, not a motion to extend record deadlines or to amend or
supplement the record.17 o
d.

Amending and Supplementing the Record

Under Rule 55, if anything material to either party is omitted from
the transcript or statement of facts, the appellate court on its own
initiative, the parties by stipulation, or the trial court upon notice and
hearing may direct a supplemental record to be certified and transmitted by the clerk of the trial court or the official court reporter.' 7 '
Before submission, supplementing the record is easily accomplished. 172 The court of appeals has a mandatory duty to permit supplementation unless the disposition of the appeal would be
unreasonably delayed. 173 Practically speaking, pre-submission supplementation or amendment should almost never delay an appeal unless supplementation is requested on the eve of oral argument or
requires substantial work by the court reporter.' 74
The procedural provision for supplementing the record cannot be
used to cover up for counsel's initial failure to file a statement of
170. See Darley v. Texas Uvatan, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987)(if
more time is needed to prepare appendix solution is to file motion to extend time to file brief).
171. TEX. R. APP. P. 55(b). Correcting inaccuracies or defects in the record is not the
same as supplementation and involves different procedures. See TEX. R. APP. P. 55(a), (c); see
also Benson v. Grayson County Child Welfare, 666 S.W.2d 166, 168-69 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1983)(directing court reporter to supplement and correct statement of facts and granting appellant's motion to extend time to file brief). See generally 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL
& APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 659 (Tex. Practice 1985).
172. TEX. R. APP. P. 55. Rule 55 is consistent with the philosophy that courts should
not deprive litigants of their right to be heard on appeal due to a defect in or omission from the
record if the problem can be remedied without unduly delaying the judicial process or harming
the other parties. See Flowers v. Bauer, 394 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1965, no writ)(construing predecessor to rule 55); see also Gay v. City of Hillsboro, 545 S.W.2d
765, 766 (Tex. 1977)(rule providing for supplemental record should be given liberal
construction).
173. TEX. R. APP. P. 55(b) (appellate court "shall permit" supplementation unless appeal
would be unreasonably delayed). Of course, the court does not have to allow supplementation
if the omitted matter is not "material." See id.; see also 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 659 n.28 (Tex. Practice 1985)(court of appeals not obligated to allow
supplementation if it would serve no purpose other than to increase appellate costs).
174. See 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 659 (Tex. Practice
1985)(appellate courts "extremely lenient" in allowing pre-submission supplementing of record); see also Bracken, Mechanics of Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE: APPELLATE PRACTICE D-24 (1986)(appellate court may be less generous when
supplementation will require court reporter to prepare additional transcription which delays
disposition of appeal).
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facts.' 75 If the statement 1of
facts was not filed on time then there is
76
nothing to "supplement."'

Obtaining permission to supplement the record after submission is
more difficult than during the pre-submission stage. If an omission is
discovered shortly after oral argument and correction or supplementation would not delay disposition of the appeal, leave should be
granted. 177 On the other hand, appellate courts have consistently refused to permit new material to be filed after the court has written its
opinion and rendered its judgment in the absence of "unusual circumstances." ' Permitting supplementation or amendment of the record
at that late stage of the appellate process is viewed as interfering with
the orderly administration of justice, as well as being contrary to the
rules establishing appellate deadlines and placing the burden on the
appellant to bring forward on appeal before submission a sufficient
record to show error requiring reversal. 179 What constitutes "unusual
circumstances" so as to justify post-judgment supplementation is unclear; however, it is settled that if the complaining party knew or
should have known of the need to supplement or amend prior to submission, leave to supplement will be denied. 1 0
175. See Bracken, Mechanics of Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, PROCEDURAL INSTID-24 (1986).
176. See Carr v. Central Music Co., 494 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973,
no writ)(supplemental record not permissible without properly filed statement of facts).
177. See Elkins v. Auto Recovery Bureau, 649 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)(appellate courts have discretion to allow supplementation of record after submission); see also TEX. APP.-SAN ANTONIO LOCAL R. 4(A) (supplemental transcript may be
filed at any time if all parties agree to filing).
178. See, e.g., K & S Interests, Inc. v. Texas Am. Bank/Dallas, 749 S.W.2d 887, 891
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry. v. Alvarez, 670 S.w.2d 338,
353 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984), rev'd on othergrounds, 683 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1985); Irrigation
Constr. Co. v. Motheral Contractors Inc., 599 S.W.2d 336, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, no writ).
179. See K & S Interests, 749 S.W.2d at 891; Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry. Co. 670 S.W.2d at
353-54; see also Archer v. Storm Nursery, Inc., 512 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1974, no writ).
180. See, eg., Missouri-Kan.-Texy Ry., 670 S.W.2d at 353-54 (counsel had ample notice of
failure of statement of facts to reflect trial court's rulings on objections to charge); Elkins, 649
S.W.2d at 76 (appellate attorney should have known in advance of opinion that amended petition omitted from record was important to outcome of appeal); Irrigation Constr. Co., 599
S.W.2d at 344 (attorney who appeared for appellant as both trial and appellate counsel must
have been aware that hearing on motion for judgment was not in record).
TUTE: APPELLATE PRACTICE
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E. Briefs and Motions for Rehearing in the Court of Appeals
Once an appeal has reached the briefing stage, deadlines are no
longer tied to the date the trial court signed the judgment. The brief
of the appellant is due in the court of appeals within thirty days after
the filing of the record on appeal."8 ' If the transcript and the statement of facts are filed at different times, the due date for the appellant's brief is calculated from the date of the last filed portion of the
record. The appellee's brief is due no later than twenty-five days after
82
the appellant's brief is filed.'
There is not an absolute right to amend or supplement a brief.8 3
The appellate rules are designed to create a liberal policy of permitting amended and supplemental briefs, and briefs may be amended or
supplemented "at any time when justice requires.""4' ' Furthermore,
appeals cannot be dismissed or judgments affirmed based solely on
briefing defects without first providing the appellant an opportunity to

rebrief.'8 5
Some, but not all, courts of appeals have local rules governing the
filing of amended and supplemental briefs. 8 6 The San Antonio and
Tyler courts require all amended, supplemental or post-submission
181. TEX. R. APP. P. 74(k). Oral argument must be requested at the time the brief is
filed. TEX. R. APP. P. 75(f). The failure to timely request argument will be deemed a waiver
of the right to present argument. Id. The best practice is to place the request for oral argument on the cover of the brief. Storey, The Appellate Process, in SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF

E-37 (1988). In fact, placing the request on the brief
cover is required in some jurisdictions. See TEX. APP.-TYLER LOCAL R. VI(A)(1)(b).

LAW, APPELLATE PRACTICE INSTITUTE

182. TEX. R. APP. P. 74(m). In accelerated appeals, the appellant's brief is due 20 days
after the record is filed and the appellee's brief is due 20 days thereafter. See TEX. R. APP. P.
42(a)(3).
183. 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 718 (Tex. Practice 1985).
184. TEX. R. APP. P. 74(o). The rules for permitting supplementation of briefs are even
more liberal for appeals involving electronic statements of facts. See Darley v. Texas Uvatan,
Inc., 741 S.W.2d 200, 204 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987)(granting extension of time to file brief
and stressing liberal supplementation for briefs in appeals under Dallas county pilot project);
see also TEX. R. APP. P. 74(p)("Briefing Rules to be Construed Liberally"). But see Keltner,
Post-Judgment Remedies, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED PERSONAL INJURY COURSE
BB-26 (1987)(experience indicates some courts of appeal take restrictive approach on amended
and supplemental briefs).
185. Impetco, Inc. v. Texas Am. Bank/Houston, 729 S.W.2d 300, 300 (Tex. 1987); accord Kaspar v. Thorne, No. 05-87-00750-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas July 29, 1988)(WESTLAW,
Tx-Cs library).
186. See, e.g., TEX. APP.-CORPUS CHRISTI LOCAL R. V (B); TEX. APP.-SAN
ANTONIO LOCAL R. 1 (C); TEX. APP.-TYLER LOCAL R. V (F). The Texarkana, Austin,
Dallas, Amarillo, Waco and Houston (Fourteenth District) appellate courts do not have
printed local rules. The local rules for the courts in Eastland, Beaumont and El Paso do not
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briefs to be accompanied by a motion for leave to file unless the brief
is merely replying to the last brief filed.18 7 Even a reply brief, at least
in the San Antonio Court, must be supported by a motion for leave if
not tendered by noon at least seven days prior to the date of scheduled
oral argument.1 88 In contrast, the Corpus Christi local rule states that
reply briefs may be filed as a "matter of right" up to the date of submission, 189 but requires a motion for leave to accompany post-submission briefs. I 90 If counsel is uncertain about the propriety of filing a
brief, then a motion for leave should be filed with the brief explaining
the need for additional briefing. 1 '
In practice, courts generally decline to consider briefs in which the
appellant seeks to add additional points of error; 192 although the court
has the discretion to do so. 19 3 The closer to the date of submission a
brief is filed and the greater the extent to which a brief injects new
issues into an appeal, the less likely an appellate court is to accept the

discuss amended and supplemental briefs. The Fort Worth Court is apparently in the process
of updating its rules.
187. See TEX. APP.-SAN ANTONIO LOCAL R. I(C); TEX. APP.-TYLER LOCAL R. V
(F). Treating reply briefs differently from supplemental and amended briefs is explicit in the
San Antonio rule and implicit in the Tyler rule. There is not an appellate rule specifically
dealing with reply briefs. O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-72 (1988).

188. See TEX. APP.-SAN ANTONIO LOCAL R. I(C).
189. TEX. APP.-CORPUS CHRISTI LOCAL R. III(B).
190. Id. As a further contrast, the First Court of Appeals, sitting in Houston, apparently
permits all briefs to be filed without leave of court unless the brief raises new points of error.
See TEX. APP.-HoUSTON [1ST DIST.] LOCAL R. 1:74(c).
191. See O'Connor, Perfectingthe Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-76 (1988); see also Poole v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 638 S.W.2d 10, 13
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(ordering supplemental brief stricken
when filed nine days before submission without leave of court and raised cross points of error
not contained in original brief). Of course, a supplemental or amended brief may be filed only
if the original brief was timely filed. 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE
§ 718 (Tex. Practice 1985).
192. See Linan v. Linan, 632 S.W.2d 155, 156-57 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no
writ)(declining to consider brief which changed basis of appeal); Dennis Weaver Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Chadwick, 575 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(refusing to consider constitutional argument raised in supplemental brief filed long after
receipt of appellee's brief). Several courts have local rules prohibiting post-submission briefs
from including new points of error or additional grounds of recovery. See TEX. APP.CORPUS CHRISTI LOCAL R. III(C); TEX. APP.-TYLER LOCAL R. V(G).
193. See Minneapolis Moline Co. v. Purser, 361 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(court may grant leave to file amended brief with additional points of
error after submission and rendition of opinion).
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brief.'94
If the appellant fails to file the brief on time, the court of appeals is
entitled to dismiss the appeal, affirm the trial court's judgment or
enter other orders.' 95 If the appellant, however, provides a reasonable
explanation for failing to timely file the brief and appellee has not
suffered material injury due to the delay, the court cannot dismiss or
96

affirm. 1
In most courts, when the appellant has failed to file a brief on time,
the court will issue an order directing the appellant to show cause
why the appeal should not be dismissed for want of prosecution. If
the appellant fails to show cause or respond within the allotted time,
the appeal will be dismissed. 197
Although the rules do not provide for sanctions against an appellee
who fails to timely file a brief, the failure to file an appellee's brief can
have a substantial impact on the outcome of the appeal. First, in the
absence of a brief filed by the appellee, the court of appeals is entitled
to accept as true all factual statements in the appellant's brief, without
examining the record.198 Second, by failing to file a brief, the appellee
waives any right to assert certain types of cross-points attacking the
lower court's judgment. 199

194. See 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 718 (Tex. Practice
1985)(motion to amend or supplement brief filed on eve of or after oral argument may be
denied). Courts routinely accept and sometimes solicit post submission briefs, however, on
issues raised at oral argument not previously briefed by the parties. See, e.g., TEX. APP.CORPUS CHRISTI LOCAL R. Ill(C) (rules on post submission briefs requested by court).
195. TEX. R. APP. P. 74 (I)(1); see also Bainbridge v. Bainbridge, 662 S.W.2d 655, 657
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ)(where no brief is filed, court may decline to dismiss appeal
and give other direction to cause as it deems proper).
196. See TEX. R. APP. P. 74(l)(1).
197. See Seminole, Inc. v. Oak Hollow Property Owners' Ass'n, 669 S.W.2d 872, 872
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ)(appeal subject to dismissal for failure to timely file
brief complying with rules and for failure to respond to court's order providing appellants with
ten days to file new brief).
198. TEX. R. APP. P. 74(f). Appellate courts, however, are not obligated to accept unchallenged statements as true; they simply have the discretion to do so. See Rocha v. Campos,
574 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ)(court of appeals has
considerable discretion concerning whether to adopt uncontroverted statements in appellant's
brief). But see Navistar Int'l Corp. v. Valles, 740 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no
writ)(reversing trial court's judgment and holding appellees' failure to file brief "compelled"
court of appeals to accept facts alleged by appellant in its brief). See generally 31 J. WICKER,
CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 711 (Tex. Practice 1985)(discussing circumstances
when appellate court should not blindly adopt unchallenged statements in appellants' brief).
199. See 31 J.WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 712 (Tex. Practice
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If the appellee intends to raise cross-points asking for greater relief
than awarded by the court below, the appellee should file a brief even
though the appellant has missed the briefing deadline. The due date
for filing the appellee's brief in that situation is "prior to the call of the
'2
case. '""
While it is unclear when an appeal has been "called" for
purposes of this rule, appellee cannot wait until the appeal has been
dismissed for want of prosecution to file the brief with cross-points.2"'
A motion for rehearing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to challenging the judgment of the court of appeals in the Texas Supreme
Court.2 0 2 Whether the matter complained of originated in the trial
court or the court of appeals, it must be assigned as error in the motion for rehearing.2 °3 Under Rule 100, the motion for rehearing must
be filed in the court of appeals within fifteen days after the date of
rendition of the judgment or decision. 2° Within fifteen days after the
appellate court judgment, the motion for rehearing may be amended
without leave of court. 20 5 After that time, the motion may only be
amended with leave of the court.20 6
Rule 100 provides that a reply to the motion is unnecessary unless
requested by the appellate court.20 7 While that rule does not impose a
deadline for filing a reply, at least one court of appeals requires replies
to be filed within five days of the filing of the motion.20 s
If the motion for rehearing is granted and the judgment of the court
of appeals is changed, a party seeking to complain about that judg1985). See generally Patrick & Watkins, Limited and Cross-Appeals, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE (1988).

200. See TEX. R. APP. P. 74(m).
201. See Yellow Checker Cab Co. v. Nilhas, 711 S.W.2d 741, 741 (Tex. App.-Austin
1986, no writ).
202. See City of Denton v. Van Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 833 n.2 (Tex. 1986); see also
Dawkins v. Van Winkle, 377 S.W.2d 830, 830 (Tex. 1964).
203. See 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 778(3) (Tex. Practice

1985).
204. TEX. R. APP. P. 100(a).
205. See TEX. R. APP. P. 100(e).
206. See id.
207. TEX. R. APP. P. 100(b). But see TEX. APP.--CORPUS CHRISTI LOCAL R. C
("strongly advising" parties to respond to motions for rehearing to provide court with com-

ments on motion and court's opinion).
208. For instance, when the San Antonio Court of Appeals notifies counsel by postcard of
the filing of a motion for rehearing, that notice states that replies must be filed within five days
of the motion. The deadline for replies to motions for rehearing is not found in the local rules
for the San Antonio court but apparently represents an informal internal operating procedure.
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ment must file a second motion for rehearing.2 °9 Under rule 100, a
second motion for rehearing may be filed if, in response to the first
motion for rehearing, the court modifies or vacates its judgment or
hands down an opinion in connection with overruling the motion.210
A second motion is not permitted if the court overrules the first motion without an opinion.2 11 A second motion for rehearing must be
filed within fifteen days of the new judgment or opinion.212
F. Briefs and Motions for Rehearing in the Supreme Court
Any party seeking to complain of the judgment of the court of appeals must file an application for writ of error within thirty days after
the last timely motion for rehearing filed by any party is overruled.213
The application is filed with the clerk of the court of appeals, not the
supreme court.214 Once one party files an application, any party who
was entitled to, but did not file an application, may do so within ten
days after the date the previous application was filed.215 This ten day
grace period ensures that the right of an opposing party to file an
application for writ of error cannot be cut off by waiting until the last
possible moment and filing an application on the thirtieth day.21 6
The respondent to the application for writ of error has fifteen days
from the filing of the application in the supreme court to file an an209. See Oil Field Haulers Ass'n v. Railroad Comm'n, 301 S.W.2d 183, 188 (Tex.
1964)(second motion needed whenever prior motion granted, prior judgment vacated and new

judgment entered). See generally Scott, Motions for Rehearing & Applications for Writs of
Error, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE (1987).

210. See TEX. R. APP. P. 100(d). When a party may file a second motion for rehearing is
clear. When a party has to file a second motion for rehearing to invoke the supreme court's
writ of error jurisdiction over the appealing party's complaints, however, represents a complex
and unsettled issue. See generally Scott, Motions for Rehearing & Applications for Writs of
Error, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE (1987); 32 J.
WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 852 (Tex. Practice 1985).

211. Scott, Motions for Rehearing & Applications for Writs of Error, in STATE BAR OF
TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE N-6 (1987).

212. TEX. R. APP. P. 100(d).
213. TEX. R. APP. P. 130(b).
214. Id.; see also Storey, The Appellate Process, in SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW,
APPELLATE PRACTICE INSTITUTE E-42 (1988). Filing an application cannot be used to cut off
the court of appeals' jurisdiction over other parties' motions for rehearing. The court of appeals retains jurisdiction over the appeal until all motions have been decided. Doctors Hosp.
Facilities v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 750 S.W.2d 177, 178-79 (Tex. 1988).
215. TEX. R. APP. P. 130(c).

216. See id.
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swer. 2 17 The deadline for the respondent's brief does not run from the
time of filing of the application in the court of appeals, but begins
once the clerk of the court of appeals has transmitted the record and
application to the supreme court where it is filed. 2 18 The clerk of the

supreme court will forward a postcard to all parties informing them of
the date of filing of the application. 21 9 At that point, respondent's

fifteen days to reply to the application begins.
As is the case with briefs in the courts of appeals, the application
for and answer to the writ of error may be amended or supplemented
when justice requires. 220 A motion for leave should accompany the
amended or supplemental briefing, setting out the reasons additional
briefing is needed.221
The motion for rehearing is due in the supreme court within 15
days of the date the supreme court rendered its judgment, decision or
order refusing, denying or dismissing an application.222 The parties
have five days after notice from the supreme court clerk in which to
223
file an answer to the motion for rehearing.
The supreme court may shorten the time for filing or responding to
a motion for rehearing if the ends of justice require.224 While the
court of appeals cannot prohibit the filing of a motion for rehear'
ing,2 25 the supreme court can "deny the right to file it altogether."226

217. See TEX. R. APP. P. 136(a). Any cross-points the respondent wishes to raise in the
supreme court should be included in its reply brief or those points may be deemed to have been
waived. See Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518, 521-22 (Tex. 1988).
218. See TEX. R. APP. P. 136(a). See generally O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-87

(1988).

219. See O'Connor, Perfectingthe Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-87 (1988).
220. See TEX. R. APP. P. 131(h), 136(g). A sharply divided supreme court recently applied a restrictive interpretation of the rule permitting amendments. See Davis, 752 S.W.2d at
521-23.
221. See text and accompanying notes 183 - 194, supra.
222. TEX. R. APP. P. 190(a).
223. TEX. R. APP. P. 190(d).
224. See id.
225. See Cowan v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 722 S.W.2d 843, 846-47 (Tex. 1987); Stoner
v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843, 846-47 (Tex. 1979).
226. See TEX. R. APP. P. 190(a). Second motions for rehearing are barred by appellate
rule 190(d). Presumably that rule does not bar second motions when the court has vacated a
prior judgment.
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MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION: IN GENERAL

Extensions in the Court of Appeals

In the court of appeals, rule 73 designates the information which
must be included in a motion for extension of time. Each extension
motion must contain the following:
(1) The court below, the date of judgment, and the number and style of
the case;
(2) the date the appeal was perfected, if an appeal has been perfected;
(3) if the extension of time is being sought for filing the appellate record, the filing dates of any motions for new trial and the date any motions were overruled;
(4) the deadline for filing the item in question;
(5) the length of time requested for the extension;
(6) the number of extensions granted previously concerning the item in
question;
(7) the facts relied upon to reasonably explain the need for an extension; and,
(8) if an extension is being requested for filing the statement of facts,
the facts relied upon as a reasonable explanation for the need for an
extension must be supported by a court reporter's affidavit or the trial

the7 earliest date
judge's certificate, and the court reporter's estimate of 22
filing.
for
available
be
will
facts
of
when the statement
Rule 73 applies to all extension motions, even motions to extend time
to file a brief.228 Furnishing such information as the date the appeal
was perfected and the record was filed seems unnecessary when the

appeal has already reached the briefing stage, particularly when one is
representing the appellee; yet, compliance with rule 73 is
mandatory.229
Without a proper extension motion on file, the court of appeals has
no authority to consider the untimely filed item.2 30 The party seeking
the extension of an appellate filing deadline has the burden of ensur227. See TEX. R. APP. P. 73(a) - (i). Several courts of appeal have local rules requiring
information in addition to that required by rule 73. See TEX. APP.-CORPUS CHRISTI LOCAL
R. V (A); TEX. APP.-SAN ANTONIO LOCAL R. 3(B), (C).
228. 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 716 (Tex. Practice Supp.
1987)(rule 73 governs the content and form of all motions for extension of time filed in the
court of appeals).
229. See O'CONNOR, Perfectingthe Appeal, in STArE BAR OF TEXAS ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE G-54 (1987)(requiring appellee to furnish all information required by
rule 73 seems superfluous).

230. E.g., B.D. Click Co. v. Safari Drilling Corp., 638 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1982); Vil-
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ing that his motion complies with all substantive and procedural requirements.23 ' If the motion is supported by briefs, affidavits or other
proof or papers, they must be served and filed with the motion.232 A
response to a motion for extension of time is not required by the appellate rules,2 33 but is permitted.234 It is advisable to file a response if
the extension motion is factually or legally incorrect.235 If no response is filed, the court of appeals will generally take the factual
averments in the motion and supporting proof as true.236
The motion to extend an appellate deadline must be filed in the
appropriate court.2 37 While this requirement would seem obvious,
there are numerous instances of extension motions filed in the wrong
court with the more prominent examples involving appeal bonds.238
Despite the fact that an appellate court has not yet acquired jurisdiction, a motion to extend the deadline for filing the cost bond must be
filed in the court of appeals, not the trial court.239 If the extension
lareal v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 742 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987);
Moore v. Wallace, 663 S.W.2d 903, 904 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
231. Westergard, Motions for Extension of Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
581, 589 (1981)(construing predecessor rules to current appellate rules).
232. See TEX. R. ApP. P. 19(a).
233. Rule 73 does not discuss responses to extension motions. See TEX. R. APP. P. 73.
234. See TEX. R. APP. P. 19(a) (any party entitled to respond to motions in appellate
court within 10 days after service of the motion).
235. See text and accompanying notes 299 - 301, infra; see also Westergard, Motions for
Extension of Time UnderRule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 581, 590 n.38 (1981)(courts are more
likely to grant uncontested motion for extension than contested motion because, due to the
failure to contest the motion, appellee waives error). The Tyler court even has local rules
providing that unopposed motions for extension of time to file the statement of facts, supported
by affidavit, and unopposed extension motions for briefs will be granted "as a matter of
course." TEX. APP.-TYLER LOCAL R. III (2), (3). The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
requires any opposition to a motion to be accompanied by a short brief. See TEX. APP.CORPUS CHRISTI LOCAL R. V.
236. Moore v. Davis, 644 S.W.2d 40, 43-44 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982)(in absence of challenge by appellee to movant's statement that parties were negotiating settlement at time of
deadline for statement of facts, court held that settlement talks represented reasonable explanation for untimely filing); Scheffer v. Chron, 560 S.W.2d 419, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(granting extension after accepting at "face value" appellant's
statement that delay was due to deadline miscalculations); see also TEx. R. APP. P. 74(f)
(court authorized to accept unchallenged statements in appellant's brief as true).
237. Westergard, Motions for Extension of Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
581, 590 (1981); see also Tax. R. APP. P. 73.

238. See generally Westergard, Motionsfor Extension of Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 581 (1981).

239. See Fite v. Johnson, 654 S.W.2d 51, 52 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ). Not only
must the appellant file in the court of appeals a motion "reasonably explaining" the need for an
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motion is filed in the trial court, that motion has no effect and jurisdiction of the appellate court will not be invoked.2 4°
For almost every appellate filing deadline, the motion to extend
must be filed in the court of appeals no later than fifteen days after the
original due date. 241 The fifteen-day period is absolute and may not
be enlarged. 242 If the extension motion is filed after the fifteen-day
period, the motion cannot be considered by the appellate court; that
court has no authority to permit the late filing of the item in question
no matter how justifiable the delay.243 The failure of an appellant to
comply with the fifteen-day period cannot be waived by appellee's failure to object, 244 nor can appellee agree to an untimely motion. 245 In
extension, but the appellant must also file the bond or the substitute within the same 15-day
period in the trial court. If either the cost bond or the motion is filed late or in the wrong
court, an extension cannot be granted and the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
See Alvarado v. State, 656 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no
writ)(dismissing appeal when both bond and extension motion filed in appellate court);
Palmire v. Pickett, 645 S.W.2d 328, 328 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ)(court had
no authority to consider motion to extend filing deadline for bond because motion was untimely despite timely bond).
240. See Fite, 654 S.W.2d at 52; see also McPherson v. Sawyers, 565 S.W.2d 123, 123-24
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978) (trial court's order extending time to file record held nullity). A
second likely area for filing extension motions in the wrong court involves applications for writ
of error. While an application for writ of error is filed in the court of appeals, an extension
motion regarding that application is filed in both the court of appeals and the supreme court.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 130(d) (extension of time to file application for writ of error must be filed
in both court of appeals and supreme court). A motion for extension of time filed only in the
court of appeals would not authorize an extension of the filing deadline. Id.
241. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41(a)(2) (cost bond or substitute); TEX. R. APP. P. 54(c) (record); TEX. R. APP. P. 100(g) (motions for rehearing in court of appeals); TEX. R. APP. P.
130(d) (application for writ of error). The First Court of Appeals in Houston has a local rule
which apparently eliminates the 15 day grace period by requiring all extension motions to be
filed on or before the item in question is due to be filed. See TEX. APP.-HouSTON [iST DIST.]
LOCAL R. 1.73(a).
242. B.D. Click Co. v. Safari Drilling Corp., 638 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1982). In holding that the 15 day limit is inflexible, the court emphasized the importance of certainty and
finality in the appellate process. See id. Rule 54(a) essentially codifies the holding in Click,
stating: "[tihe court ... shall have no authority to consider a late filed transcript or statement
of facts, except as permitted by this rule." See TEX. R. APP. P. 54(a).
243. See Westergard, Motionsfor Extension of Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
581, 585 (1981)(regardless of validity of excuse for late filing, courts will not consider untimely
extension motion). Even if the appellate court clerk marks an untimely transcript as "filed,"
the court lacks authority to consider it without a timely extension motion. Migura v. Migura,
730 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
244. J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 652 (Tex. Practice 1985).
245. Carrao v. Committee of Unauthorized Practice, 638 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Tex. App.Dallas 1982, no writ)(appellee sent letter to court stating he had no objection to late statement
of facts). While filing in the wrong court or complying with the 15 day deadline is not waiv-
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other words, if you miss the original filing deadline, and then miss the
fifteen day extension deadline, you are out of luck.2 "
The fifteen-day period applies to successive extension motions.2 4 7

A motion to extend a filing deadline established by the court of appeals in response to a previous extension motion must be filed within
fifteen days after the extended filing date.248 If the first extension motion is overruled, the second motion must be filed within fifteen days

of the original filing deadline - not within fifteen days of the overruling of the initial motion.249
Calculating the fifteen-day period is essentially identical to determining other appellate deadlines. 250 The original due date for the
able, the movant's failure to comply with the technical requirements of rule 73 can be waived if
the nonmovant fails to object to the defects. See Sifuentes v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 754
S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988). In addition, while counsel cannot waive fundamental
defects, he can agree to an extension which has been properly requested. Some courts have
local rules encouraging agreed motions for extension. See TEX. APP.-HouSTON [IT DIsT.]
LOCAL R. 1:55(b); TEX. APP.-CORPUS CHRIsTI LOCAL R. V. Seeking opposing counsel's
agreement particularly should be considered when counsel for the appellant has missed the
filing deadline for his brief by a wide margin or needs a lengthy extension. Rule 74(l)(1) states
that the court is entitled to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution when appellant fails to
file a brief, unless both a reasonable explanation is shown for the failure and that "appellee has
not suffered material injury thereby." See TEX. R. APP. P. 74(l)(1). Any concern over the
existence of a "material injury" can be obviated through obtaining apppellee's agreement to
filing a late brief.
246. As succinctly described in one article:
Fifteen is the magic number. For the cost bond, transcript, statement of facts, or motion
for rehearing, the court loses the authority to grant an extension 15 days after a deadline.
This is true no matter how good the cause or how badly the court wishes to grant the
extension. This situation usually means the end of the appeal. Suffice it to say, do not be
late with your motion, but if you are, do not be more than 15 days late.
Liberato & Peveto, The Nuts and Bolts of Civil Appellate Practice: Lessons Learned at the
Court of Appeals, 50 TEX. BAR J. 642, 643 (1987); accord Westergard, Motions for Extension
for Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 581, 585 (1981).
247. Chojnacki v. First Court of Appeals, 699 S.W.2d 193, 193 (Tex. 1985)(disapproving
intermediate appellate court's holding that 15 day limit inapplicable to second extension
motion).
248. Id.
249. Sifuentes v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 754 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988)
(defective extension motion does not extend time to file proper motion). There is no limit on
the number of extension motions which can be granted. Presumably, so long as a reasonable
explanation is shown and the motion otherwise complies with procedural and substantive requirements, an extension can be granted. See 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE
PROCEDURE § 716 (Tex. Practice 1985)(rules do not place limit on number of extensions
which may be granted for filing brief).
250. See Westergard, Motionsfor Extension of Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
581, 585-86 (1981)(discussing calculating appellate deadlines under former rules which were
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item is not counted but the last day of the fifteen-day period is
counted, unless that day is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.2"' If
the original deadline for filing the statement of facts and transcript
falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, the fifteen-day period for
filing the motion to extend begins on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.25 2 If counsel inadvertently obtains the
extension of a deadline to a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, the
fifteen-day period for filing the item in question or the next extension
motion should also begin on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
Counsel need not wait until the passage of the filing deadline to file
an extension motion.2 53 It may be obvious before the perfection of the
appeal that it will be impossible for the court reporter to complete a
lengthy statement of facts on time.2 54 Although it might be difficult to
actually prove a reasonable explanation for the need for an extension
when filing a motion several weeks or months in advance of the due
date, there is no procedural or substantive bar to filing the extension
motion before expiration of the deadline.2 55
One deadline in the court of appeals can be enlarged even if the
extension motion is not filed within fifteen days after the original filing
deadline. Either the appellant or the appellee may request an extension of time to file a brief by filing a sworn motion showing a reasonable explanation of the need for more time.2 56 That motion is not

essentially identical to current appellate rules). See generally text and accompanying notes 3-

61, supra.
251. See id.
252. See TEX. R. App. P. 4; see also Phoenix v. John F. Scott & Co., 676 S.W.2d 441,
442-43 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(rule 4 applies to appellate
timetables).
253. See Westergard, Motionsfor Extension of Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
581, 586 (1981)(no proscription in rules against filing extension motion prior to date of required filing). In fact, some local rules prohibit filing a motion for extension after deadline.
TEX. APP.-HOUSTON [1ST DIST.] LOCAL R. 1:73(a).
254. See Westergard, Motionsfor Extension of Time Under the Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L.
REV. 581, 586-87 (1981).

255. See id. at 587.
256. See TEX. R. App. P. 74(n). The San Antonio Court allows its clerk to authorize

extensions of briefing deadlines for up to 14 calendar days. See TEX. APP.-SAN ANTONIO
LOCAL R. 3(c)(2). That local rule, however, requires the extension request to be made prior to
the due date for the brief. There is no 15 day grace period. See id. Both the San Antonio
court and the Corpus Christi court have local rules governing the information to be included
in a motion requesting an extension for a brief. See TEX. APP.-CORPUS CHRISTI LOCAL R.
V(B); TEX. APP.-SAN ANTONIO LOCAL R. 3(c)(1).
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subject to the fifteen-day deadline governing other appellate filings;2 57
however, if the appellant has failed to file its brief on time, the appellate court may dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution, unless a
reasonable explanation is shown for such failure and appellee has not
suffered material injury due to the delay in filing.2 58
Rule 73 does not explicitly require a sworn motion.2 5 9 A sworn
motion is, however, required by some courts of appeal. 26 As a practical matter, to satisfy rule 73, verification will probably be
necessary.2 6 '
Rule 73 requires the length of the extension request to be specified
in the motion.2 62 For that reason, requesting an extension of unspecified length, or globally requesting one for "as long as needed," will
result in the court of appeals requesting counsel to furnish a specific
date or length of time or arbitrarily selecting the due date.2 63
Extension motions are disposed of by the court of appeals without
argument. 2 6 Under rule 19(e), an extension motion is generally not

257. Bracken, Mechanics of Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE:
APPELLATE PRACTICE D-27 (1986); see 6 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE
§ 151.05 (1987)(rules do not set deadlines for filing extension motions concerning briefs). Not
only are briefing deadlines not subject to the 15 day limit, but at least one court has concluded
that a strict showing of reasonable explanation is not required for late briefs. See Castillo v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 663 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
258. See TEX. R. APP. P. 74(l)(1).
259. See TEX. R. APP. P. 73. But see O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF
TEXAS ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-73 (1988)(rule 73 requires sworn
motion).
260. See TEX. APP.-CORPUS CHRISTI LOCAL R. V (all motions containing factual allegations must be sworn to); TEX. APP.-SAN ANTONIO LOCAL R. 3(A) (mandating that all
motions, not just extension motions, be verified).
261. See Westergard, Motionsfor Extension of Time Under Rule 2 1 c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
581, 592 (1981)(verification will be required if motion contains disputable factual allegations);
see also TEX. R. APP. P. 19(d) (motions dependent on facts not in record and not known to
court must be supported by affidavits or other evidence).
262. See TEX. R. APP. P. 73(f). Neither the appellate rules nor case law limits the duration of the extension which may be granted. See 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE
PROCEDURE § 716 (Tex. Practice 1985). See generally Westergard, Motions for Extension of
Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 581, 593-94 (198 1)(discussing permissible length of
extensions and problem of excessive extensions). One court has a local rule prohibiting extending briefing deadlines for more than 45 days. See TEX. APP.-TYLER LOCAL R. 111(3).
263. See Westergard, Motionsfor Extension of Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
581, 591 (1981)(general prayers for vague time period should be avoided since lack of specificity may indicate to court that extension being requested to obtain mere continuance).
264. Bracken, Mechanics of Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE:
APPELLATE PRACTICE D-25 (1986); see TEX. APP.-CORPUS CHRISTI LOCAL R. V ("only in
rare instances will the court permit a hearing on a motion").
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submitted for determination until the other parties have had ten days
after service of the motion in which to file a response; 265 but, the court
is entitled to shorten or extend the time for responding to any motion.26 6 In most courts of appeals, counsel receive notice of the
court's disposition of the extension motion by postcard or one-sentence letter. In cases involving complicated facts or novel legal issues,
courts will issue a written opinion in connection with the grant or
denial of an extension.267
An extension motion for one appellate matter, if granted, does not
result in the extension of other appellate filing deadlines. For example, a timely filed motion for extension concerning the statement of
facts does not automatically extend the deadline for filing the transcript or vice versa.268 If the filing deadlines for both parts of the
record on appeal need to be extended, separate extension motions will
be necessary, or the motion for extension should expressly refer to
both the statement of facts and the transcript, and provide reasonable
explanations for filing both late. 269 An extension motion, however,
concerning the "record" has been viewed as encompassing both the
transcript and the statement of facts.2 7 °
Similarly, filing a motion to extend the time for filing the cost bond
on appeal, even if granted, does not automatically extend the filing
deadlines for filing the record.271 If the court of appeals extends the
265. See TEX. R. APP. P. 19(e). In cases of emergency, the motion can be acted upon
without awaiting response. Id.
266. See id.; see also TEX. APP.-CORPUS CHRISTI LOCAL R. V (court will not decide
motions for ten days after service unless motion agreed to).
267. See, e.g., Chojnacki v. Court of Appeals, 699 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1985); B.D. Click
Co. v. Safari Drilling Corp., 638 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. 1982); Meshwert v. Meshwert, 549 S.W.2d
383 (Tex. 1977).
268. See, e.g., Tickle v. Thaman, 674 S.W.2d 322, 323 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1983, no writ); Escamillo v. Strong, 582 S.W.2d 605, 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1979, no writ); Cook v. Hudson, 558 S.W.2d 522, 523 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no
writ). See generally 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 652 (Tex.
Practice 1985).
269. See Embry v. Bel-Aire Corp., 502 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. 1973); Escamillo, 582
S.W.2d at 606. The appellee, as well as the appellant, is entitled to move for an extension of
the time to file the record. See Kobdish v. Kobdish, 741 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. App.-Austin
1987)(granting appellee's extension motion based on appellee's need for statement of facts to
support cross-points despite fact rule 54(c) only mentions appellant's right to extensions).
270. See McDonald v. Brennan, 704 S.W.2d 136, 139 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
271. Collins v. Williamson Printing Corp. 746 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988,
no writ); Pierson v. Josef Mfg., Inc., 665 S.W.2d 193, 193 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
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due date for the bond, then the appellant must file a separate motion
to extend the deadline for filing the record.2 72
Not all appellate deadlines can be extended. The deadline for filing
a motion for new trial within thirty days after the signing of the judgment is absolute and not subject to extension.2 7 3 Similarly, there apparently is no provision for extending the deadline for perfecting
appeals by writ of error2 74 or in accelerated appeals.2" 5
B.

Extensions in the Supreme Court

The rules governing extension motion practice in the supreme court
are relatively simple and infrequently litigated since the only appellate
matters generally filed in the supreme court are the application, the
answer, additional briefs, the motion for rehearing and the response.
Rule 160 governs the contents of the motion for extension of time for
filing an application for writ of error and requires:
(1) the court of appeals and the date of its judgment, together with the
number and style of the case;
(2) the date upon which the last timely motion for rehearing was
overruled;
(3) the deadline for filing the application; and,
(4) the facts
relied upon to reasonably explain the need for an
7 6
extension.1

272. See Pierson, 665 S.W.2d at 193.
273. See Thomas v. Davis, 553 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1977).
274. See 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 565 (Tex. Practice
Supp. 1987)(since rule governing perfection of appeal by writ of error does not provide for
extending deadlines, it would appear that such extension motions are prohibited).
275. See St. Louis Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Summerhouse Joint Venture, 739 S.W.2d
441, 442 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ)(time to file bond in accelerated appeal
cannot be extended since rule 42 has no provision for extending that deadline). But see Turner
v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 645 S.W.2d 936, 936 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ)(rules governing extension motions apply to interlocutory appeal); O'Connor, Perfecting the Appeal, in
STATE BAR OF TEXAS ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-29 (1988)(some Texas
appellate courts grant extensions to file bond or substitute in accelerated appeals); 31 J.
WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 652 (Tex. Practice Supp. 1987)(due date
for filing bond in accelerated appeals can be extended under rule 54(c) but there is no 15 day
grace period for extension motions).
276. TEX. R. App. P. 160(a)-(d). In addition to the usual extension motion focused on a
reasonable explanation of the delay in filing an application, an extension may be granted by the
supreme court upon the filing of a sworn motion showing that neither the petitioner nor his
counsel had notice or actual knowledge of the order overruling the period for filing the application. TEX. R. APP. P. 130(d). Analogous to the procedure for motions for new trial alleging a
lack of notice of a judgment, the motion in the supreme court must specify the earliest date
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While the application for writ of error is originally filed in the court

of appeals 277 and subsequently transmitted to the supreme court, the
motion to extend time to file the application is not filed in the court of
appeals, but in the supreme court.27 8 A copy of the extension motion,
however, is filed with the court of appeals. 279 Since a fifteen-day grace
period also governs applications, the extension motion must be filed
not later than fifteen days after the due date for the application. 280 An
untimely application for writ of error will be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction if an extension request is not timely filed and then
granted.2 8 '
Rule 136, which governs responses to the application of writ of er-

ror, does not directly discuss extending the deadline for filing a response.2 82 As a practical matter, the supreme court will rule on
extension motions concerning respondent's briefs, but it will not delay

submission of the case until the respondent files a brief.28 3 Generally,
the court will inform respondent's counsel that the brief will be considered when filed but, in the meantime, the court might act on the
writ of error. 28 4 If the application presents only one or two clear-cut
legal issues and the record is insubstantial, there is a significant possibility that the court may act on the application, before receiving respondent's brief. On the other hand, counsel is probably safe in
assuming that the supreme court will not act immediately on an appli-

that the petitioner or its attorney received notice or acquired actual knowledge of the order on
the motion for rehearing. See id.; see also text and accompanying notes 202 - 212, supra. The
extension motion must be filed within 15 days of the date that notice or knowledge was acquired, but not more than 90 days after the inception of the timetable for filing the application.
TEX. R. APP. P. 130(d). If the motion for extension is granted, the timetable for filing the
application starts from the date the extension motion was granted. See 32 J. WICKER, CIVIL
TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 857 (Tex. Practice Supp. 1987); see also Novsco Serv.
Div. v. Lassman, 686 S.W.2d 197, 201-03 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no
writ)(granting extension of time to file untimely motion for rehearing on due process grounds
when movant failed to receive notice of overruling of first motion).
277. See TEX. R. APP. P. 130(b).
278. See TEX. R. ApP. P. 130(d); TEX. R. ApP. P. 160.
279. See TEX. R. APP. P. 160.
280. See TEX. R. APP. P. 130(d).
281. See City of Denton v. Van Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 833 n.2 ('Tex. 1986).
282. See TEX. R. APP. P. 136. The rule simply states that the answer is due within fifteen
days of the filing of the application "unless additional time is granted." See id.
283. O'CONNOR, Perfecting the Appeal, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE C-87 (1988).
284. Id.
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cation which presents numerous diverse points of error arising from a
lengthy trial which generated a mammoth record.
With respect to motions for rehearing in the supreme court, there is
nothing in the appellate rules concerning the procedure for extension
motions for the motion for rehearing or response. 2 "5 The supreme
court nevertheless grants such motions. It is, however, an open question whether there is a fifteen-day grace period for motions requesting
an extension of time to file a motion for rehearing. Until the issue is
resolved, the extension motion should be filed before the motion is
due.
IV.

A.

EXTENSION MOTIONS: THE REASONABLE EXPLANATION

In General

The central component of every motion for extension filed in an
appellate court is the "reasonable explanation." Whether appellate
counsel is attempting to enlarge the filing deadline for the cost bond,
record or a brief, the motion for extension must reasonably explain
the necessity for an extension by alleging and proving grounds which
are factually and legally sufficient. Since the viability of an extension
motion is invariably predicated upon the adequacy of the "reasonable
explanation," a substantial body of case law has evolved concerning
procedural and substantive requirements on this issue.
In Meshwert v. Meshwert,286 the leading case interpreting the "reasonable explanation" requirement, the supreme court concluded that
the term "means any plausible statement of circumstances indicating
that the failure to file within the [appellate deadline] was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake or mischance."287 While the definition of reasonable explanation is settled,
Texas courts have not applied that definition consistently. Courts
vary regarding the harshness with which they evaluate reasonable explanations and have reached different results in seemingly indistinguishable situations.288
In most instances, the reasonableness of the explanation is not really in issue because the extension request is based on a delay in the
285.
286.
287.
288.

See id. at C-90.
549 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1977).
Id. at 384.
See text and accompanying notes 304 - 387, infra.
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preparation of the statement of facts due to the court reporter's workload, and, that type of extension is granted as a matter of course.28 9

When the reasonableness of the explanation is a serious issue, the
courts appear to decide those motions on a case-by-case basis, subjectively weighing the evidence in light of the Meshwert test.
The movant for the extension of the appellate deadline has the burden to prove the "reasonable explanation. ' ' 290 As previously discussed, although rule 73 does not specifically require extension
motions to be sworn, several courts of appeals have local rules requiring verified extension motions.291 Moreover, rule 19(d) states:
Evidence on Motions. Motions dependent on facts not apparent in the
record and not ex officio known to the court must be supported by affi2 92
davits or other satisfactory evidence.

Consequently, the movant generally will need to file an affidavit or
sworn motion since the facts comprising the alleged reasonable explanation will almost never be in the appellate record or known ex officio
293
to the court.

289. See text and accompanying notes 304 - 320, infra. At one time, a showing of "good
cause" was the standard for obtaining an extension of an appellate deadline. 31 J. WICKER,
CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 716 n.l (Tex. Practice 1985). The good cause
standard is more onerous than the "reasonable explanation" criteria. Id. Consequently, appellate opinions on extension requests construing the good cause standard and denying an extension are no longer sound precedent. Id. Conversely, opinions granting an extension because
the movant satisfied the "good cause" test remain persuasive authority for demonstrating that
the movant has satisfied the less stringent "reasonable explanation" standard. Id.; see also
Coulson v. Lake LBJ Mun. Util. Dist., 678 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. 1984)(good cause more
stringent standard than reasonable explanation).
290. Westergard, Motions for Extension of Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
581, 589 (198 l)(construing predecessor rules to current appellate rules).
291. See text and accompanying notes 260 - 262, supra; see also Escamillo v. Strong, 582
S.W.2d 605, 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ)(dismissing appeal and denying extension motion when movant filed unverified motion in violation of local rule).
292. See TEx. R. APP. P. 19(d).
293. See, e.g., Byars v. Steel, 625 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1981)(denying extension motion which contained no verification of facts reported to exist and conduct
allegedly constituting inadvertence); Carter v. Goldberg, 598 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1980)(denying extension motion and stressing that appellant had burden to produce "sworn statement"); Martin v. Russell, 590 S.W.2d 155, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1979)(denying motion to extend record deadline since movant failed to produce any
verified proof). "It is the opinion of the court that the facts alleged in the motions and relied
upon by movants as constituting a reasonable explanation.., must be proved by affidavit or by
some legitimate form of evidence that can be considered by an appellate court." Hutcheson v.
Hinson, 543 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976)(overruling motion for extension of
time to file transcript).
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Any testimony, whether encompassed in an affidavit or a sworn
motion, should set forth facts which would be admissible into evidence and demonstrate that affiant has personal knowledge of the subject matter of his testimony.29 The proof supporting the motion
should contain as much detail as possible. Framing the affidavit or
295
motion in terms of factual or legal conclusions should be avoided
and relying on broad assertions of "inadvertence, mistake or mischance" can be fatal to the movant.2 96 The greater the detail in the

supporting proof and the less conclusory, the more likely the appellate
court is to grant the extension.
If the party files more than one motion for extension, the reasonable explanation proffered in each motion must stand on its own
facts. 2 97 Appellate courts tend to question the credibility of successive
extension motions which simply reiterate allegations of inadvertence
and mischance previously used as an excuse for a missed deadline. 298
The non-movant is entitled to submit proof to rebut the reasonableness of the proffered explanation or to otherwise establish that the
requested extension should be denied.299 In numerous cases, the nonmovant has successfully persuaded the appellate court that the rea294. Hutcheson, 543 S.W.2d at 720 (extension motion must be supported by legitimate
proof). The summary judgment rule outlines the characteristics of competent affidavit testimony. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(e) (affidavits shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in testimony and establish that affiant is competent to testify on subject matter of affidavit). If
documents are submitted with the motion, that proof should be in the form of certified copies.
See id.
295. "Flimsy or rote excuses will not provide a 'reasonable explanation' which entitles
the movant to an extension of time." Wolters v. Wright, 623 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. 1981). In
the following cases, extensions were denied because the movant's proof was insufficiently detailed or conclusory. See Sonfield v. Sonfield, 709 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1986, no writ)(broad allegations concerning confusion of deadlines by counsel); Splawn
v. Zavala, 652 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ)(claim that settlement negotiations prevented timely filing of bond unsupported by facts showing how settlement talks
caused late filing); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Yendrey, 605 S.W.2d 676, 677-78 (Tex. Civ.
App.--Corpus Christi 1980, no writ)(court reporter's conclusory affidavit about more time);
Carter v. Goldberg, 598 S.W.2d 903, 909-10 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ)(facts
stated in appellant's motion insufficient for court to determine whether good cause existed).
296. See Byars v. Steel, 625 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1981)(extension
request based on glohal assertion of inadvertence denied).
297. Wolters, 623 S.W.2d at 303.
298. See Home Ins. Co. v. Espinoza, 644 S.W.2d 44, 45 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
299. See Wiggington v. Parker Square State Bank, 321 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1959, no writ)(appellee successfully contested appellant's motion for
extension).
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sonable explanation, as alleged and proven by the movant, was factually inaccurate or based on an incomplete version of the facts. 3° In
addition to relying on affidavits to challenge the movant's reasonable
explanation, the non-movant should consider using other types of
proof. To illustrate, evidence that the movant had been guilty of dilatory behavior and discovery abuse throughout the course of the litigation led one appellate court to conclude that appellant's reasonable
explanation was not credible.3 °1
In many instances, it is pointless to contest a motion for extension
unless the reasonable explanation claimed is facially specious, untrue
or legally insufficient. Most courts routinely extend the filing deadline
for the appellant's or appellee's brief at least once for thirty days or
even longer.3 0 2 Likewise, courts customarily grant multiple extension
for filing the statement of facts based on the court reporter's workload. 3 To ensure that counsel does not damage his credibility with
the appellate court by repeated opposition to meritorious motions, the
better practice is to contest only those extension requests which are
truly questionable.
B.

Reasonable Explanations: Acceptable and Unacceptable
1. Delays Attributable to the Court Reporter

Each month, appellate courts grant hundreds of motions for extensions of time to file the statement of facts based upon affidavits by
court reporters that they are busy with other official duties, such as
their day-to-day attendance at judicial proceedings or the preparation
of other statements of facts. 3° While the court reporter's workload
does not literally qualify as "inadvertence, mistake or mischance" as
required by Meshwert, appellate courts uniformly accept that situation as a reasonable explanation for the necessity of an extension. 30 5
300. See, e.g., Winston Int'l Elec., Inc. v. Rio Radio Supply Inc., 726 S.W.2d 161, 161-62
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ)(affidavits of court reporter and deputy clerk submitted to prove record not timely requested); Pena v. Petroleum Cas. Co. 441 S.W.2d 657, 658
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, no writ)(appellee denied appellant's claim that parties had
discussed settlement); Wiggington, 321 S.W.2d at 336 (extension motion overruled when appellee filed affidavit of clerk which contradicted appellant's motion).
301. See Winston Int'l Elec., 726 S.W.2d at 161-62.
302. See text and accompanying notes 289 - 290, supra.
303. See text and accompanying notes 304 - 320, infra.
304. Zimmerman v. Boyce, 660 S.W.2d 837, 839-40 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983)(granting
motion to extend filing due date for cost bond).
305. Id. See, e.g., Sumner & Greener v. Carlson, 739 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. App.-Fort
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Rule 73 specifically requires a motion for extension of time which is
based upon the court reporter's workload to "be supported by the
affidavit of the court reporter, or the certificate of the trial judge,
which shall include the court reporter's estimate of the earliest date
when the statement of facts will be available for filing."' 30 6 While rule
73 does not directly require proof of the reporter's workload, that
type of proof is nonetheless required by some local rules.3 °7 If not
procedurally required, it should be included since it bolsters the validity of the movant's reasonable explanation. 30 8 The court reporter's
affidavit should describe the statements of facts required to be prepared along with their anticipated length and completion date, the
court reporter's daily responsibilities in the trial court and any other
activities or duties which would prevent the reporter from working on
the statement of facts on which an extension is being requested. 3° 9
An appellate court is not bound to accept conclusory affidavits of
court reporters which globally allege that the reporter is "too busy" to
meet the deadline. 3 10 Nor are courts required to automatically adopt
the court reporter's estimated completion date as the due date for the
statement of facts in the court of appeals. If numerous extensions

Worth 1987)(granting request to extend deadline for filing statement of facts); Monk v. Dallas
Brake & Clutch Serv. Co., 683 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984)(granting motion to
extend time for filing statement of facts); Briarcroft Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Foster Fin. Corp.,
533 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(good cause test); see
also O'Neal v. County of San Saba, 577 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no
writ)(granting fourth motion to extend time for filing statement of facts stating "[t]his Court is
conscious of the need for extensions of time when a court reporter has conflicting duties"). In
like fashion, the workload of the district clerk is a reasonable explanation in support of a
motion to extend the deadline for filing the transcript. See Hildyard v. Fannel Studio, Inc.,

547 S.W.2d 332, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.---Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(granting extension and overruling motion to affirm).
306. See TEX. R. APP. P. 73(i).
307. See TEX. APP.-CORPUS CHRISTI LOCAL R. V(A); TEX. APP.-SAN ANTONIO LOCAL R. 3(B)(5).
308. See Sumner & Greener, 739 S.W.2d at 128-29 (granting extension when reporter's
affidavits discussed other duties); see also Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Yendrey, 605 S.W.2d
676, 677 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1980, no writ)(denying extension when reporter's
affidavit did not detail workload).
309. See TEX. APP.-SAN ANTONIO LOCAL R. 3(B)(5).
310. See Yendrey, 605 S.W.2d at 677 (conclusory affidavit of court reporter summarily
rejected as proof of reasonable explanation); see also 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 652 (Tex. Practice 1985)(not uncommon for appellate court to require
reporter to file detailed affidavits proving number of hours spent on case and on official matters
not connected with case).
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already have been granted,311 or if the reporter's affidavit is factually
weak, it is not uncommon for a court to reduce the time requested in
the extension motion, direct the court reporter to complete the stateand parties
ment of facts by a specified date, and advise the reporter
31 2
that no further extension motions will be entertained.
If counsel is confronted by a court reporter who refuses to complete
the statement of facts, is lazy or cannot be located, that type of situation will qualify as a reasonable explanation - if adequately
proven.3 13 Counsel, however, will need to file a sworn motion for extension or affidavit detailing all attempts to obtain preparation of the
statement of facts. If it becomes apparent early in the appellate process that counsel is going to have difficulty in obtaining a statement of
facts, each contact or attempt to contact the reporter should be memorialized by a confirmatory letter and/or a memorandum to the file.
That memoranda and correspondence should be attached as exhibits
to the extension motion.
Once it becomes clear that the reporter is not working diligently, or
even at all, on the statement of facts, counsel should file a petition for
writ of mandamus in the court of appeals.314 If the court reporter
ignores the mandamus, then he risks being held in contempt by the
court of appeals. 315 Particularly stubborn court reporters have been
ordered confined to the county jail to work on the statement of
facts.316
On occasion, the inability of the court reporter to timely complete
311. See TEX. APP.-CORPUS CHRISTI LOCAL R. V (A)(2) (very detailed affidavit required if statement of facts not completed when initially estimated and additional extensions
needed).
312. See, e.g., O'Neal v. County of San Saba, 577 S.W.2d 795, 796-97 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1979)(granting fourth motion to extend time for filing statement of facts); Garza v.
Berlanga, 575 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978)(granting extension of
time to file statement of facts); Modine Mfg. Co. v. Northeast Ind. School Dist., 489 S.W.2d
458, 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972)(granting motion to extend filing deadline for
record).
313. See Wolters v. Wright, 623 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex. 1981).
314. See Wolters, 623 S.W.2d at 305 (since preparing statement of facts takes precedence
over all other duties, court reporter may be forced by writ of mandamus to produce statement
of facts). See generally Baker & Smith, Simplifying Appellate Procedure:A Proposalto Turn
Management of Court Reporters Over to the Courts, 7 THE ADVOCATE 12 (State Bar of Texas
1988).
315. See In re Sanchez, 698 S.W.2d 462, 463 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, orig.
proc.). See generally 31 J. WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 652 (Tex.
Practice 1985).
316. See Ex parte Sanchez, 703 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. 1986). If sanctions and a writ of man-
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the statement of facts is not attributable to workload. If the court
reporter is dead 317 or ill, 318 of course, that qualifies as a reasonable
explanation. Similarly, if the court reporter's notes or significant exhibits have been misplaced or lost, thereby preventing timely completion of the statement of facts, the extension motion should be
granted.319
In sum, appellate courts invariably grant extension motions for the
statement of facts due to a busy, lazy or ill court reporter. In those
situations, counsel has little actual control over compliance with the
filing deadline and "a court should not punish the innocent
appellant.

'320

2. Mistakes by Court Personnel
No matter how egregious, the negligence 32 1 of or even fraud 322 by
official court personnel does not automatically enlarge a deadline an extension motion is still necessary. A variety of mistakes and
omissions by clerks and other courthouse personnel, however, have
been upheld as justification for granting an extension motion. Misplacing the appellate record,3 23 and confusing the cause number for

the appeal324 or the matters to be included in the transcript 325 have

damus are ineffective in producing an appellate record, the cause may be remanded to the trial
court for a new trial. Wolters, 623 S.W.2d at 305-306.
317. See Victory v. Hamilton, 127 Tex. 203, 207, 91 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1936, opinion adopted)(reversing for new trial when reporter's death made transcription of
trial impossible).
318. See Carmichael v. Carmichael, 432 S.W.2d 126, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco)(granting motion to extend statement of facts deadline because reporter's illness constituted good cause).
319. See Gallegos v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 539 S.W.2d 353, 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1976)(granting extension of time to file record).
320. See Wolters, 623 S.W.2d at 306. Counsel simply has little actual control over the
sick, busy or lazy court reporter, which is why extensions are granted in those situations.
Zimmerman v. Boyce, 660 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983)(granting motion to
extend due date for filing cost bond). It is an abuse of discretion for the court of appeals to
dismiss the appeal when the court reporter cannot or will not prepare it on time. 31 J.
WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 652 (Tex. Practice 1985).
321. See Nix v. Fraze, 752 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
322. See White v. White, 700 S.W.2d 317, 318 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ

ref'd n.r.e.)(denying extension motion as untimely despite fact court reporter allegedly lied
about having filed statement of facts in court of appeals).
323. See Gallegos v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 539 S.W.2d 353, 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-San

Antonio 1976)(granting extension of time to file record); Hooe v. Texas Fire & Casualty Underwriters, 151 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1941, no writ)(good cause standard).
324. See Coulson v. Lake LBJ Mun. Util. Dist., 678 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. 1984).
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been upheld as reasonable explanations.
If counsel has been led to believe that the record has been filed by
the court reporter or clerk when it has not in fact been filed, such
evidence might represent a reasonable explanation for untimely filing.3 26 Appellate counsel, however, cannot ignore the plain language
of the appellate rules or basic principles of common sense and choose
to rely on something a deputy clerk has said or done. 27 For instance,
waiting to perfect an appeal until the clerk furnishes an appellate
timetable is not reasonable; the clerk does not have that responsibility
3 28
and there is no provision in the rules authorizing him to assume it.
Similarly, counsel cannot rely on a clerk's miscalculation of a deadline.329 It is counsel's responsibility to read the appellate rules and
calculate deadlines; relying on a clerk's miscalculation, which is contrary to the rules, is conscious indifference.33 °
3.

Miscalculation of Deadlines by Counsel

It is well established that miscalculating an appellate deadline constitutes a reasonable explanation for an extension. 33 1 Texas law is unclear, however, concerning the point at which an attorney's lack of
diligence in determining deadlines becomes so egregious as to warrant
denying an extension.
Courts have recognized a distinction between the attorney, who is
aware of the applicable rule and appellate deadline and misinterprets
325. See Riewe v. Estate of Goslin, 632 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Tex. App.-Austin
1982)(granting motion to extend time to file transcript and overruling motion to affirm on
certificate because delay reasonably explained by clerk's confusion over documents to be included in transcript); Hudgens v. Texas Casualty Ins. Co., 465 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Tex. Civ.
App.- Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(district clerk's workload and confusion over due date
for transcript was good cause for extension).
326. See Nix v. Fraze, 752 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ); White v.
White, 700 S.W.2d 317, 318 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Sears
v. State, 605 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980)(relying on clerk to forward transcript did not constitute reasonable explanation and denying extension motion), motion to review under rule 21c denied on other grounds, 610 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. 1980).
327. See Brice v. Brice, 581 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
328. See Kirkland Corrosion Control, Inc. v. Fisher, 632 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. App.Austin 1982, no writ)(denying motion to extend time to file brief).
329. See Brice, 581 S.W.2d at 701.
330. See id. at 701. But see Green v. City of Lubbock, 627 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(misunderstanding between clerk and counsel was reasonable
explanation for late brief).
331. Exposition Apartments Co. v. Barba, 624 S.W.2d 414, 417-18 (Tex. App.-Austin
1981)(granting extension motion and denying dismissal motion).
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that rule, and the attorney who simply makes no effort to examine the
rules and determine due dates. a32 As one court has observed:
The phrase 'miscalculation of the due date' is not the talisman by which
all extensions of time will be automatically granted, but rather is only
the threshold fact after which the circumstances leading to the miscalculation will be closely scrutinized .... We believe that an attorney
who intends to appeal a case is responsible for becoming familiar with
the rules of appellate procedure and must determine the due dates of
Court. Failure to do this
the various papers that are to be filed with our
33 3
explanation.
reasonable
a
provide
will not
In other words, the total failure to read the applicable, easily available
rules setting out the steps needed to perfect an appeal or present a

sufficient record to show reversible error does not qualify as "inadvertence, mistake or mischance. ' 334 That type of conduct is more properly characterized as conscious indifference.3 35
There is no question that granting extensions based on counsel's

miscalculations of and confusion over deadlines seemingly represents
judicial toleration of malpractice. Or, at least, it shows a judicial hesitancy to punish clients with negligent counsel.3 36
One line of authority, however, has expressly rejected professional

negligence as justifying an extension. 337 These courts have concluded

332. See Home Ins. Co. v. Espinoza, 644 S.W.2d 44, 45 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(refusing to grant extension of time to file cost bond); Joslin v. Joslin,

636 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ)(denying motion for extension of time to file statement of facts).
333. Joslin, 636 S.W.2d at 636 (denying motion for extension of time to file statement of
facts); see also Home In&, Co., 644 S.W.2d at 45-46 (refusing to grant extension of time when
attorney's affidavit consisted of global allegation of mistake about filing time for bond).
334. Furr v. Furr, 721 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ)(overruling
motion to extend deadline for filing pauper's affidavit).
335. See id; see also Joslin, 636 S.W.2d at 520 (denying motion for extension of time when
attorney apparently never looked at straightforward language of rule governing due date for
record requests).
336. See Scheffer v. Chron, 560 S.W.2d 419, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)(negligence, inadvertence or mistake of counsel is imputed to client).
337. See, e.g., Furr,721 S.W.2d at 567 (overruling extension motion based on attorney's
lack of familiarity with appellate rules in indigent appeals); Sonfield v. Sonfield, 709 S.W.2d
326, 327-28 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ)(extension denied when attorney
confused about record and bond deadlines in accelerated appeals); Home Ins. Co. v. Espinoza,
644 S.W.2d 44, 45-46 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(refusing to grant
extension of time to file cost bond); Joslin, 636 S.W.2d at 520 (denying motion for extension of
time to file statement of facts based on counsel's mistaken impression about due date); In re
Interest of F.F., 636 S.W.2d 444, 446-47 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ)(rejecting
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that "reasonable explanation" under Meshwert means:
The minimum conduct may be something less than diligence, but it
must be greater than negligence and indifference. An error resulting
from indifference, negligence or disregard is not based on a plausible
338
explanation, and therefore cannot be considered to be reasonable.

They further reason that negligence cannot excuse a missed deadline
because the appellate rules would be "absurd and meaningless if any
explanation would suffice." 3' 39

In contrast, another line of authority has concluded that counsel's
negligence may well represent a reasonable explanation for the necessity of an extension. 3 ° The courts adopting this more liberal view of
the reasonable explanation test emphasize that the focus under
Meshwert is "on a lack of deliberate or intentional failure to comply. 341' Accordingly, they conclude that any conduct short of deliberate or intentional noncompliance qualifies as inadvertence, mistake
or mischance-even if that conduct can also be characterized as professional negligence.3 42

extension motion asserting attorney had misconception about deadlines due to revisions in
appellate rules).
338. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Yendrey, 605 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1980, no writ); accord Joslin, 636 S.W.2d at 520 (denying motion for extension
of time to file statement of facts).
339. Yendrey, 605 S.W.2d at 677; accord Splawn v. Zavala, 652 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
340. See, e.g., Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Group Holding Corp., 751 S.W.2d 229,
231-32 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ)(attorney miscalculated due date by relying on repealed rule); Exposition Apartments Co. v. Barba, 624 S.W.2d 414, 417-18 (Tex. App.-Austin 1981)(overruling motion to dismiss or affirm and granting "motion to consider the
transcript as filed" when counsel miscalculated transcript due date); Scheffer v. Chron, 560
S.W.2d 419, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(court expressed serious
doubts about excuse claiming mathematical error on date to file new trial motion, nevertheless,
court overruled appellee's motion to dismiss appeal); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Strickland,
547 S.W.2d 338, 339-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977)(motion to permit late filing of transcript granted when attorney miscalculated date upon which motion for new trial was overruled). Cases from the two lines of authority are often not reconcilable. In Heritage Life, 750
S.W.2d at 232, the court granted an extension motion based on deadline miscalculation and
acknowledged its holding was directly opposite to a ruling on virtually the same facts in Home
Ins. Co. v. Espinoza, 644 S.W.2d 44, 45 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ)(refusing to
grant extension of time to file cost bond). The Heritage court criticized the Espinoza court as
following a "reasonable diligence" standard instead of the Meshwert test of inadvertance, mistake or mischance. See Heritage Life, 751 S.W.2d at 232.
341. See Heritage Life, 751 S.W.2d at 232.
342. See id. at 232; see also Jackson v. Crawford, 715 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. App.Dallas 1986)(extending deadline for statement of facts because "diligence" not standard under
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The courts adopting the liberal view of the reasonable explanation
test are right because the Meshwert standard encompasses negligence.
In Meshwert, the Texas Supreme Court explicitly held that extensions
should be granted when the delay is attributable to mistake or inadvertence. An attorney who, after reading the appellate rules, miscalculates a deadline acts negligently, but he also acts mistakenly and
inadvertently; 343 therefore, he and his client are saved by Meshwert.
On the other hand, if counsel never looks at the rules to determine if
and when a motion for rehearing should be filed, he has acted deliberately and his extension request should be denied. 3 "
There are two fundamental problems with restrictive view of the
reasonable explanation which describes the standard as "the minimum conduct may be something less than diligence, but it must be
'
First, that viewpoint iggreater than negligence and indifference." 345
nores the fact that an inadvertent act can also be a negligent act. Second, it erroneously implies that "negligence" means something other
than lack of diligence.346
Furthermore, the supreme court in Meshwert recognized that the
reasonable explanation test closely resembles one element of the test
applied by Texas courts to set aside a default judgment. 47 If the
Meshwert); Zimmerman v. Boyce, 660 S.W.2d 837, 841-42 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983)("inadvertence" under Meshwert test by definition encompasses negligence).
343. Significantly, Meshwert is a deadline miscalculation case in which the supreme court
rejected a diligence standard. See Meshwert v. Meshwert, 543 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. App.Beaumont 1976), aff'd, 549 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1977).
344. Banales v. Jackson, 610 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. 1980).
345. See Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Yendrey, 605 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
346. See Moore v. Davis, 644 S.W.2d 40, 42 n.2 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1982)(granting
motion to extend deadline for filing statement of facts).
347. Meshwert, 549 S.W.2d at 384 (adopting reasoning of courts which had viewed reasonable explanation test as same in principle as test used to overturn defaults); see also Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Group Holding Corp., 751 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, no writ)(default judgment law similar to appellate extension motion law); Westergard,
Motionsfor Extension of Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 581, 599 (198 l)(discussing
applicability of default judgment precedent to extension motion litigation). In the landmark
Texas case on vacating defaults, the court in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex.
388, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939), held:
A default judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered in any case in which the
failure of the defendant to answer before judgment was not intentional, or the result of
conscious indifference on his part, but was due to a mistake or an accident; provided the
motion for a new trial sets up a meritorious defense and is filed at a time when the granting thereof will occasion no delay or otherwise work an injury to the plaintiff. (emphasis
added)
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party seeking to vacate the default judgment negligently failed to answer the lawsuit, a court nonetheless may set aside the default so long
as that party neither acted deliberately nor with conscious
indifference.3 48
In sum, when faced with an extension motion alleging that an attorney miscalculated or was confused about deadlines, the court should
grant the extension so long as the proof shows that noncompliance
was not intentional nor the result of conscious indifference. No public
policy interest is promoted if a litigant's constitutional right of access
to an appellate court can be irretrievably lost by the ordinary negligence of his counsel.34 9
Whether counsel's appeal is in a jurisdiction adopting a strict or
liberal view of the reasonable explanation test, extension motions conceding deadline miscalculations are probably more closely scrutinized
by courts of appeals than any other. Consequently, the motion must
contain substantially more factual detail than merely conclusorily alleging a "miscalculation of the due date." The sworn motion should
describe counsel's efforts to determine appellate deadlines and the reason for the miscalculation. For instance, consider the situation where
the date of judgment was entered incorrectly in the attorney's file,
resulting in an untimely bond. In that case, the motion should set out
who was responsible for the file entry; why the information was recorded incorrectly, such as transposition of numbers or inter-office
miscommunication; any efforts to double-check the judgment date;
counsel's reading of rule 4 1(a); and, the calculation of deadlines based
on the incorrect date. If someone other than appellate counsel entered the date incorrectly, or was the recipient of erroneous information, it would be advisable to obtain an affidavit from that person as
well. Finally, it might be helpful to provide proof of inter-office verification procedures designed to prevent miscalculation errors and to
ensure that deadlines usually are accurately computed.

348. See Dallas Heating Co. v. Pardee, 561 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)(negligence is not test by which defaulting party's actions are measured); Farley v. Clark Equip. Co., 484 S.W.2d 142, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)("[i]t has been clearly established that negligence is not the test" for appellate review of
order refusing to set aside default judgment).
349. As the Texas Supreme Court recently observed: "[w]e have long recognized that the
right of access to an appellate tribunal is a valuable one, constitutionally protected against
arbitrary or unreasonable abrogation." Doctors Hosp. Facilities v. Fifth Court of Appeals,
750 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. 1988).
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4. Workload of Appellate Counsel
An extension motion cannot be used as a motion for continu-

ance. 35 0 For that reason, courts (at least in reported decisions) have
uniformly rejected the appellate attorney's workload 35 1 or preoccupa-

tion with other business352 as a reasonable explanation for an extension.35 3 The San Antonio Court of Appeals, in fact, has a local rule
specifying that the court will not consider the "heavy workload of an

attorney" as an acceptable explanation for failure to file a brief on

time.35 4
In reality, appellate courts routinely grant motions to extend the

time to file a brief based on sworn allegations of the heavy workload
of appellate counsel. Some courts hesitate to permit more than a
350. Wolters v. Wright, 623 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. 1981).
351. See, e.g., Bragg v. City of Dallas, 608 S.W.2d 696, 696-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1980)(counsel had just returned from vacation and alleged demand of other matters upon his
time made timely completion of motion for rehearing impossible); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Dalton, 602 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ)("fact that counsel is
busy, and perhaps overworked is not 'good cause'," but granting extension anyway); Dawson
v. First Continental Real Estate Inv., 590 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1979, no writ)(timely completion of motion for rehearing prevented by jury trial and
other legal business); Brice v. Brice, 581 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no
writ)(counsel preoccupied with other litigation so filed record late); see also Garza v. State, 503
S.W.2d 415, 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ)(busy preparing murder trial
not good cause); J.D. Lee v. J.D. Owen, 404 S.W.2d 84, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1966, no writ)(counsel was county attorney and busy doing county work as well as own law
practice); Ransom v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 144 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo,
writ dism'd judgmt cor.)(one counsel busy with several trials while other involved in race for
county judge).
352. See Brice v. Brice, 581 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, writ dismissed)(counsel busy with sale of business, Christmas holidays and other affairs), cert denied,
444 U.S. 901 (1979); Breitkreutz v. Century Western, 380 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Tex, Civ. App.Tyler 1964, writ ref'd)(counsel engaged in political campaign not good cause).
353. The reasoning underlying these decisions was stated in Camp v. Neal, 2 S.W.2d 473
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928, no writ):
The general rule is that other professional engagements of counsel are not sufficient excuse
for the failure of appellant's attorney to properly brief his case. If he finds that he will not
be able, because of other professional business, to prepare and file his brief, it is the duty of
his client to employ other counsel to do so.
Id. at 473.
354. TEX. APP.-SAN ANTONIO LOCAL R. 3(c)(1). That local rule is enforced. See Fox
v. San Antonio Savings Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 257, 257 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no
writ)(affirming judgment and denying appellant's extension motion based on local rule). The
El Paso court has acknowledged that it has granted uncontested extension motions for briefs
based on workload even though that excuse did not qualify as good cause. See Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Dalton, 602 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980)(conditionally
denying motion to dismiss).
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thirty to forty-five day extension of the deadline for filing a brief unless the case presents complex factual and legal issues or involves a
mammoth appellate record.3 55
Despite case law and local practices condemning filing extension
motions based on workload, filing a brief on time is sometimes impossible because of an unforeseeable increase in an attorney's trial or appellate docket. In those cases, if counsel is solely responsible for
preparation of the brief, heavy workload should represent a reasonable explanation.
To avoid the risk that an appellate court will rely on law prohibiting extension motions based on workload, the motion should not be
framed in terms of the routine day-to-day burden of practicing law.
Instead, the motion should stress "unexpected legal work" which
"unforeseeably prevented counsel from the preparation of the brief."
If counsel, during the time allotted for preparation of the brief, is unexpectedly called to trial or suddenly required to file a mandamus
proceeding in the appellate court, that type of circumstance should
qualify as a reasonable explanation.3 5 6 In addition, the motion should
emphasize the unavailability or impracticality of any other attorney
preparing the brief, particularly, if counsel is a member of a large
firm.

3 57

When relying on workload as the basis for an extension request, the
sworn motion should include, whenever possible, the following information: (1) specific details on the other work preventing timely completion of the brief, identifying that work by case styles and numbers;
(2) the nature of the other work, i.e., a factually complex products
liability suit with several legal issues of first impression; (3) the unexpected and unforeseeable nature of the involvement in the other work,

355. See TEX. APP.-TYLER LOCAL R. lII (B)(3) (no extensions of time to file a brief for
more than 45 days will be granted).
356. As discussed earlier, extension motions are granted based on delays attributable to
the court reporter. See text and accompanying notes 304 - 320, supra. While that circumstance does not technically qualify as mistake, inadvertence or mischance under Meshwert, the
extension is granted because the cause for the delay is not within the movant's control. Zimmerman v. Boyce, 660 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983)(granting motion to extend
filing due date for cost bond). An unforeseeable, overwhelming increase in workload is often
completely out of counsel's control.
357. See Camp v. Neal, 2 S.W.2d 473, 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928, no
writ)(extension motion denied because although appellate counsel was prevented from filing
brief due to professional engagements, no reason shown why another attorney could not have
filed brief).
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i.e., a mandamus proceeding requiring immediate resolution due to an
impending trial setting; (4) a general estimate of the amount of time
required to complete the other work; (5) the fact that counsel is solely
or primarily responsible for the preparation of the brief; and (6) that
as a result of the unexpected, unforeseeable work, it was not possible
to complete the brief on time.
With respect to perfecting the appeal or filing the record, it is difficult to see how an attorney's workload could ever reasonably explain
a late cost bond, transcript, statement of facts, or record request, or at
least justify a lengthy delay. Perfecting an appeal is a relatively routine matter for any non-indigent party, as well as being a procedure
for which appellate rules provide a lengthy time period. Likewise,
counsel has little control over the preparation of the transcript and
the statement of facts, and the filing of the record represents a ministerial task; therefore, counsel's workload normally should be immaterial to the timely filing of the record.3 58

5. Inter-Office Administrative Errors
This category of "reasonable explanation" may well evoke a cynical
judicial response and the suspicion that counsel is using a secretary or
word processor as a scapegoat for his own dilatory behavior or malpractice. 359 It is essential that an extension motion of this nature be
supported by factually detailed proof. For example, a conclusory
claim that a lost file prevented timely perfection of an appeal should
not warrant an extension. If that claim is supported by evidence
describing the firm's filing procedures, efforts to locate the file and the
date the file was located, an extension is justified.
Assuming the extension motion is sufficiently supported by proof,
even if the clerical error causing the untimely filing is due to the negligence of appellate counsel or his staff, that type of explanation satisfies

358. Bean v. City of Arlington, 464 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth

1971)(extension motion based on attorney's illness overruled when no showing why another
member of his firm could not have performed mundane task of timely requesting record).
359. See Castillo v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 663 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(reluctantly granting extension motion and describing counsel's explanation that brief was late because his office failed to record deadline on calendar as "tenuous");
Awad Tex. Enter., Inc. v. Homart Dev. Co., 589 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex. Civ. App-Dallas
1979, no writ)(disapproving counsel's use of "secretarial error" as excuse for late brief but
granting extension because appellants not harmed by delay).
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Meshwert's "inadvertence, mistake and mischance" test. 3" Only if
the error was deliberate or resulted from conscious indifference
should the extension be denied.36
Usually, an excuse alleging a clerical error will not support a
lengthy extension. Allegations that the secretary temporarily misplaced the file 362 or the dictated draft of a brief, the client forgot to

sign the cost bond as principal or the attorney filed the record 363 or
bond 361 in the wrong court represent reasonable explanations which
justify filing delays of several days, but will generally not warrant an
extended delay.
Motions for extensions based on the fact that an item was timely
placed in the mail for filing, yet was never received by the court or
court reporter or were received late, raise reasonable explanations.
This category of excuse has been upheld when the record was received
late 365 and the request for preparation of the record was lost. 366 In
order to rely on the "lost or delayed in the mails" excuse, the motion
should be accompanied by (1) a Certificate of Mailing by the United
States Postal Service or a legible postmark affixed by the Postal Service, and (2) an affidavit that the item was sent to the proper clerk by
First-Class United States Mail in envelope or wrapper properly addressed and stamped and deposited in the mail one day or more
360. See text and accompanying notes 340 - 349, supra.
361. See Banales v. Jackson, 610 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. 1980)(afirming denial of motion
for late filing of motion for rehearing when movant's only explanation was that he did not
know rehearing motion was necessary); General Motors Corp. v. Ramsey, 633 S.W.2d 646,
648 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, writ dism'd)(meager efforts of counsel to discover disposition of
supposed order sent to trial judge did not constitute reasonable explanation for failure to
timely file transcript).
362. See Gallegos v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 539 S.W.2d 353, 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1976)(granting extension of time to file record); Hopper v. Hopper, 264 S.W.2d 444,
444 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954, no writ)(overruling motion to dismiss appeal and strike
transcript because good cause shown for extension).
363. See Gibraltar Sav. Ass'n v. Hamilton Airmart, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1983)(motion to dismiss denied and motion to extend deadline of statement of
facts granted).
364. See Omoray Davis Trucking Co. v. Lewis, 635 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ dism'd).
365. See Duncan v. Duncan, 372 S.W.2d 564, 565-66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1963)(setting aside affirmance on certificate and granting motion to extend time to file transcript based on "good cause" test).
366. See Olddaker v. Lock Constr. Co., 528 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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before the last day for filing. 367

6.

Illness of Counsel

The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that the reasonable explanation test is satisfied by proof that counsel's illness prevented
compliance with an appellate deadline.368 Illness does not, however,
create an automatic right to a lengthy extension. A bare bones allegation that counsel is sick is inadequate to justify any extension at all.36 9

Sworn proof should provide specific details on the illness of an attorney, the probable duration of the illness and how the illness prevented
compliance with the filing deadline.3 aT If the extension request involves an appellate brief and a lengthy extension is necessary, the motion should discuss the impossibility or impracticability of having
another attorney handle briefing responsibilities.3 7 ' Illness represents
a more plausible explanation for a late brief than an untimely bond or
record, which requires less attorney involvement.3 7 2
7.

Settlement Negotiations

Reliance on settlement negotiations as the reasonable explanation
for a failure to comply with a due date is risky unless it is certain that
opposing counsel will not contest the motion. If counsel claims that
an extension is necessary because he was under the impression the
case would settle, yet lacks documentation to back up that impres367. See TEX. R. App. P. 4(b). See generally text and accompanying notes 27 - 38, supra.
368. See Anderson v. Coleman, 626 S.W.2d 301, 301-02 (Tex. 1981)(plaintiff's counsel
suffered heart attack and was hospitalized at time motion for rehearing should have been filed).
369. See Bean v. City of Arlington, 464 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1971).
370. See id. at 210-11 (overruling extension motion which failed to detail date counsel
became ill, nature of illness and date of recovery). For cases granting extensions based on
attorney illness, see Zimmerman v. Boyce, 660 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1983)(granting motion to extend filing due date for cost bond when counsel suffered from
after-effects of surgery including fatigue and depression); American Nat'l Bank v. Petry, 141
S.W. 1040, 1041 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1911, no writ)(attorney under physician's constant
care for two months and appellate brief was his first project upon returning to work).
371. See Bean, 464 S.W.2d at 210 (motion overruled which failed to show why someone
else in the ill attorney's firm could not have requested record).
372. See Watson v. Sellers, 477 S.W.2d 678, 681-82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1978, no writ)(denying extension motion when counsel could have picked up completed
statement of facts before due date but did not; he then became ill, and court held he assumed
risk that facts would develop to prevent timely filing); Bean, 464 S.W.2d at 210 (although
appellant's attorney ill, extension denied when motion failed to show why other member of
firm could not have requested record by mail, messenger or telegram).
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sion, there is a strong possibility that the extension will be denied if
opposing counsel aggressively contests the motion.37 3
If it appears likely that a case will be settled on appeal and counsel
would like to avoid needlessly expending additional time and expense,
the more prudent approach is to have opposing counsel agree to: (1)
not file a contest to the extension motion; (2) inform the appellate
court in writing that he has no objection to the extension; or (3) execute an agreed motion.374 If opposing counsel will not agree to one of
those three options, the item in question should be filed, regardless of
the likelihood of settlement.
Settlement negotiations should represent a better reason for an untimely brief than a late bond or record. Deciding to delay a brief
because of the probability of settlement is acceptable since a compromise of the appeal would obviate expending extensive amounts of time
and effort in researching and writing. On the other hand, if the record
or bond is ready for filing, there is little justification for declining to
take the relatively ministerial step of filing simply because of ongoing
settlement talks. Even if the case settles after the filing of the record
or bond, little expense has been incurred. 3 " Of course, a delay in
requesting the preparation of the statement of facts due to settlement
talks makes sense because a compromise would avoid the expense of
preparing the record.
8. Hiring New Counsel on Appeal or Discharging Trial Counsel
Changing counsel after trial or hiring new or additional counsel on
appeal does not automatically entitle a party to an extension. As the
court stated in McRae Oil Corporation v. Guy,3 76
The basic duty to exercise diligence in the timely procurement of a rec373. See Splawn v. Zavala, 652 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no
writ)(motion for extension denied when no facts proved to support conclusory allegation of

delay caused by settlement talks); Pena v. Petroleum Casualty Co. 441 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, no writ)(appeal dismissed for failure to file brief, appellee denied
having led appellant to believe case would be settled); Hooe v. Texas Fire & Casualty Underwriters, 151 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1941, no writ)(refusing to file transcript
because appellee's counsel denied existence of serious settlement discussions).
374. See Moore v. Davis, 644 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982)(granting motion
to extend filing deadline for statement of facts since appellee did not contest appellant's allegation that delay was due to settlement negotiations).
375. See Splawn, 652 S.W.2d at 579 (dismissing appeal because no evidence showing how
settlement talks precluded filing bond on time).
376. 495 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ord for appeal rests on the litigants themselves. If they wish to select a
new attorney during the process of perfecting appeal, they have, absent
some special circumstances, the duty of selecting one who is in position
to timely perfect the appeal. An attorney who is not in a position to
timely perfect the appeal may not properly accept employment to do so
....Appellants did not discharge their duty of diligence by selecting at
some time during the process of perfecting appeal a new lawyer who
would require such a length of time in studying the case that the appeal
would necessarily be delayed. Having selected a lawyer to represent
them, the defendants should have assumed that an appeal might result
and they may not delay that appeal by a belated selection of another
lawyer.377

If recently retained counsel had ample time in which to evaluate
the file and comply with appellate deadlines, the extension motion is
probably unsound.3 78 The proof in support of the motion must establish that retaining new counsel caused the late filing.3 79 For example,
when counsel for appellants filed an appearance nineteen days before
the cost bond was due, a court of appeals denied an extension stating,
"[it is not reasonable to conclude that it would take that period of
time to file the cost bond, especially in view
of the fact that appellants'
380
attorney acted as surety on the bond.

9.

Miscellaneous Explanations

Indecision about whether to pursue an appeal is not a reasonable
377. Id. at 33. McRae was decided under the "good cause" standard and probably represents a more hard line approach than most present courts would adopt. The opinion nevertheless illustrates the risk of hiring new counsel late in the appellate process.
378. See, e.g., Splawn, 652 S.W.2d at 579 (extension denied when new counsel had sufficient time to timely file bond after entering appearance); Taft v. Wolma, 541 S.W.2d 673, 673
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976)(denying motion to extend due date for statement of facts
and holding insufficient conclusory assertion that counsel's delay in requesting record was due
to being recently retained); Sommer v. Richardson, 420 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1967, no writ)(despite fact appellate counsel "just retained," extension denied when
no showing trial counsel could not have taken steps to ensure record timely filed).
379. See, e.g., Daniels v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 528 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ)(dismissing appeal when no proof of date when new
counsel on appeal hired); Jones v. El Charro Drilling Co., 405 S.W.2d 229, 230 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1966, no writ)(after having granted two extensions for time to file brief based
on appellant's difficulty in securing counsel, court dismissed appeal finding no good cause for
continued failure to file brief); Hopper v. Hopper, 264 S.W.2d 444, 444 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1954, no writ)(granting extension for filing record when trial counsel withdrew, appellate counsel recently retained, and portions of file lost).
380. Splawn, 652 S.W.2d at 579.
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explanation.3 a8 The appellate rules provide ample time in which to
evaluate the advisability of an appeal; therefore, the attorney's or client's indecisiveness cannot qualify as mistake, mischance or
inadvertence. 8 2
On the other hand, financial problems affecting the appellant's ability to pursue an appeal may reasonably explain the need for an extension. The inability of an appellant to locate a surety willing to provide
a bond after a pauper's affidavit has been successfully contested, reasonably explains a late cost bond.38 3 Similarly, if the statement of
facts is late because appellant delayed requesting its preparation until
he had the funds to pay for it 38 4 or because the court reporter improperly demanded a deposit before beginning work,3 8 5 then the court
should grant an extension. On the other hand, broad claims by a litigant concerning his financial problems 3 86 and filing delays caused by
38 7
counsel waiting for advance payment for the record from his client,

381. Shriver v. McLennan County Children's Protective Services, 610 S.W.2d 229, 230
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ)(indecision about whether to appeal is not reasonable

explanation for late transcript); see also Wilson v. McCracken, 713 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ)(fact that appellant saw different attorney after
deadline for statement of facts who gave him different advice on merits of appeal did not
reasonably explain missing deadline).
382. See, e.g., Shriver, 610 S.W.2d at 230; Jahart v. Ogden, 424 S.W.2d 457, 457-58 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1968, no writ)(fact that appellant did not decide to appeal case until long
after motion for new trial overruled not good cause for late record); Dillerman v. Trager, 327
S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1959, writ dism'd)(extension refused when
counsel unable to make up mind on whether to appeal and once he did decide, clerk was on
vacation).
383. Lopez v. Foremost Paving, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 614, 619 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1984)(diligence in attempting to locate surety for bond and misfortune in not being able to do
so satisfies Meshwert test).
384. See DeLeon v. Saldana, 720 S.W.2d 173, 173-74 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986)(divided court grants appellant's motion to extend time to file statement of facts). Chief Justice
Cadena dissented on the grounds that the cost bond on file secured payment of the reporter's
fees so there was no reason to delay requesting a statement of facts. See id. at 174 (Cadena, C.
J., dissenting).
385. See, e.g., Jackson v. Crawford, 715 S.W.2d 130, 131-32 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1986)(motion to extend deadline for filing statement of facts granted); Alexander v. Bowers,
581 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979)(granting motion to extend time to file
record); Caples v. Goodwin, 578 S.W.2d 529, 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1979)(granting motion to extend time to file statement of facts).
386. See Sonfield v. Sonfield, 709 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986,
no writ).
387. See Shriver v. McLennan County Children's Protective Services, 610 S.W.2d 229,
230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ)(although attorneys received transcript one month
before due date, they waited for client to advance costs and missed deadline). But see Manges
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have been held insufficient.
V.

REVIEW OF RULINGS ON EXTENSION MOTIONS

With one exception, which will be discussed below, interlocutory
appeal of a court of appeals ruling on an extension motion is unavailable. In addition, a writ of mandamus is not available in the Texas
Supreme Court to compel the court of appeals to grant an extension
of time.3 88 Mandamus relief is available only to compel a court to
fulfill a mandatory duty or perform a ministerial task, and the granting or denying of an extension of time is discretionary with the court
of appeals.3 89
If the court of appeals overrules a motion to extend a filing dead-

line, the movant's remedy is to file an application for writ of error in
the supreme court after the court of appeals dismisses the appeal or
affirms the trial court's judgment. 390 A motion for rehearing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to supreme court review; therefore, the movant's motion for rehearing in the court of appeals must specifically
complain about the court's extension ruling.39 1 Once the motion for
rehearing is overruled, the appellant files an application for writ of
error complaining about the extension ruling.3 92
If an extension was granted by the court of appeals over the nonmovant's objection, the non-movant must wait until the final judgment is rendered by the court of appeals.39 3 At that point, the nonv. First State Bank & Trust Co., 572 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1978,
no writ)(granting motion based partially on counsel's delay in filing transcript until client paid
for it).
388. Pat Walker & Co. v. Johnson, 623 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex. 1981).
389. Id. Furthermore, a party whose extension motion has been denied has an adequate
remedy at law, the unavailability of which is a prerequisite to mandamus relief. See id. The
movant's legal remedy is to seek review of the extension ruling by filing an application with the
supreme court. Id.
390. See, e.g., 6 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 143.08 (1988); 31 J.
WICKER, CIVIL TRIAL & APPELLATE PROCEDURE § 652 (Tex. Practice 1985); Westergard,
Motions for Extension of Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 581, 595 (1981).
391. See Westergard, Motionsfor Extension of Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
581, 595 (1981).
392. See id. at 595. Compare Thornton v. Fenelon Funeral Home, 646 SW.2d 934, 935
(Tex. 1983)(reviewing the merits of order denying motion to extend deadline for statement of
facts raised on application for writ of error) with Sears v. State, 610 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Tex.
1980)(refusing to review attempted interlocutory appeal of order denying extension of time to
file transcript).
393. See Westergard, Motionsfor Extension of Time Under Rule 21c, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
581, 595 (1981).
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movant files a motion for rehearing in the court of appeals with a
point of error challenging the court's ruling on the extension motion
as error. 394 If that motion for rehearing is overruled, the non-movant
perfects an appeal by filing an application for writ of error to the
supreme court.395
In one isolated instance, however, interlocutory review by the
supreme court is allowed. In Banales v. Jackson,39 6 the supreme court
held that an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to extend the time for filing a motion for rehearing in the court of appeals
is permissible.397 The court reasoned that when the court of appeals
denies a motion for extension to file a rehearing motion, an application for writ of error is not a viable avenue of appellate review because
a rehearing motion is a prerequisite to supreme court review.39 8 The
Banales court emphasized that interlocutory review is available "only
in the instance of a denial of the requested extension of time to file a
399
motion for rehearing.
The standard of review in the supreme court is whether the intermediate appellate court abused its discretion in granting or denying
the extension motion.'
The court decides "whether the movant
presented a reasonable explanation for inability to file the document
on time, given all the facts and circumstances present." 4 1

394. See id.
395. See id. at 595-96.
396. 610 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1980).
397. Id. at 733. Oral argument on a Banales appeal is not permitted as the supreme court
decides the cause on the record alone. Anderson v. Coleman, 626 S.W.2d 301, 301-02 (Tex.
1981).
398. See Banales, 610 S.W.2d at 733.
399. Id.; see Sears v. State, 610 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Tex. 1980)(refusing to extend Banales
to denial of extension of time to file transcript).
400. Pat Walker & Co. v. Johnson, 623 S.W.2d 306, 309-10 (Tex. 1981); see Banales, 610
S.W.2d at 734 (court of appeals did not abuse discretion or act arbitrarily denying extension of
time). See generally Reyna v. Reyna, 738 S.W.2d 772, 774-75 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no
writ)(discussing abuse of discretion standard of review).
401. Thornton v. Fenelon Funeral Home, 646 S.W.2d 934, 935 (Tex. 1983); see also
Banales, 610 S.W.2d at 733 (discussing matters to be included in record in interlocutory appeal
of denial of extension of time to file motion for rehearing).
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